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Energy poverty at the household level is dened as the lack of access to electricity and
reliance on the traditional use of biomass for cooking, and is a serious hindrance to
economic and social development. It is estimated that 1.3 billion people live without
access to electricity and almost 2.7 billion people rely on biomass for cooking, a major-
ity of whom live in small communities scattered over vast areas of land (mostly in the
Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing Asia). Access to electricity is a serious issue as
a number of socio-economic factors, from health to education, rely heavily on electric-
ity. Recent initiatives have sought to provide these remote communities with o-grid
renewable microgeneration infrastructure such as solar panels, and electric batteries. At
present, these resources (i.e., microgeneration and storage) are operated in isolation for
individual home needs, which results in an inecient and costly use of resources, espe-
cially in the case of electric batteries which are expensive and have a limited number of
charging cycles. We envision that by connecting homes together in a remote community
and enabling energy exchange between them, this microgeneration infrastructure can be
used more eciently.
Against this background, in this thesis we investigate the methods and processes through
which homes in a remote community can exchange energy. We note that remote com-
munities lack general infrastructure such as power supply systems (e.g., the electricity
grid) or communication networks (e.g., the internet), that is taken for granted in urban
areas. Taking these challenges into account and using insights from knowledge domains
such game theory and multi-agent systems, we present two solutions: (i) a cooperative
energy exchange solution and (ii) a negotiated energy exchange solution, in order to
enable energy exchange in remote communities.iv
Our cooperative energy exchange solution enables connected homes in a remote commu-
nity to form a coalition and exchange energy. We show that such coalition a results in
two surpluses: (i) reduction in the overall battery usage and (ii) reduction in the energy
storage losses. Each agents's contribution to the coalition is calculated by its Shapley
value or, by its approximated Shapley value in case of large communities. Using real
world data, we empirically evaluate our solution to show that energy exchange: (i) can
reduce the need for battery charging (by close to 65%) in a community; compared with
when they do not exchange energy, and (ii) can improve the ecient use of energy (by
up to 10% under certain conditions) compared with no energy exchange.
Our negotiated energy exchange solution enables agents to negotiate directly with each
other and reach energy exchange agreements. Negotiation over energy exchange is an
interdependent multi-issue type of negotiation that is regarded as very dicult and
complex. We present a negotiation protocol, named Energy Exchange Protocol (EEP),
which simplies this negotiation by restricting the oers that agents can make to each
other. These restrictions are engineered such that agents, negotiation under the EEP,
have a strategy prole in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that our nego-
tiation protocol is tractable, concurrent, scalable and leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes
(within restricted the set of oers) in a decentralised manner. Using real world data, we
empirically evaluate our protocol and show that, in this instance, a society of agents can:
(i) improve the overall utilities by 14% and (ii) reduce their overall use of the batteries
by 37%, compared to when they do not exchange energy.Contents
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Introduction
Addressing energy poverty is a major challenge for countries around the world. Energy
poverty is dened as the lack of access to electricity or reliance on the traditional use
of biomass for cooking (IEA, 2010, p.235), and is considered to be a serious hindrance
to economic and social development (IEA, 2010, p.237). It is estimated that 1.3 billion
people live without access to electricity and almost 2.7 billion people rely on biomass for
cooking (IEA, 2010). The majority of this population is divided into small communities
scattered over vast areas of land (mostly in the Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing
Asia, see Figure 1). In particular, access to electricity is considered a necessity as
these communities can use it to meet their basic needs more eectively, such as to
power water pumps, ltering water, irrigation, storing and transporting food, providing
health services and driving communication networks. Hence, providing a community
with electricity not only improves the quality of life of its residents to a great extent
but also its economic growth and productivity (United Nations, 2012, p.14). Besides
these obvious consequences, access to electricity is also linked to education for girls
(electricity makes household chores easier thus freeing up time for schooling), reduced
children malnutrition (children born to educated women are less likely to suer from
malnutrition) and women employment in general (United Nations, 2012, p.38{40).
Despite the clear advantages of electricity, connecting these communities to the tradi-
tional centralised power distribution system or \the grid" remains challenging in devel-
oping countries due to the huge capital and maintenance costs. The \o-grid" electricity
generation options such as diesel generators or solar photovoltaic forms have been pro-
posed as an alternative solution but they have been prohibitively expensive in the past.
However, with the recent technological advances and growing interest in sustainable en-
ergy, the cost of renewable microgeneration units (e.g., solar panels and wind turbines) is
gradually decreasing and a number of recent initiatives (mainly by the non-governmental
12 Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing Asia have the majority of 1.3
billion people who do not have access to electricity2.
organisations or \NGOs") have sought to provide these communities with the o-grid
renewable microgeneration infrastructure such as solar panels, and electric batteries1.
The exact nature and type of the infrastructure that such initiatives provide, vary de-
pending on a number of factors such as their business model, environmental concerns
and government subsidies. For example, some initiatives provide an isolated microgen-
eration unit to a household (e.g., a solar panel and an electric battery for an individual
home, i.e., unit-per-household) while bigger organisations tend to provide larger infras-
tructure for the entire community, examples are a PV solar plant, a community wind
turbine or even a small hydro-power dam. Generally speaking, unit-per-households are
favoured due to their comparative costs and low maintenance, especially where house-
holds install and maintain their own personal units and payback the cost of their units
in easy instalments3.
In cases where individual homes own their resources (e.g., microgeneration units and
storage), they tend to operate these resources in isolation for their own needs. For
example, a household may own a microgeneration unit that may generate energy during
the course of a day which it can either consume immediately or store for later use as per
its energy requirements. Energy generation from these units varies with the time of day
depending on the type of microgeneration unit (e.g., solar panel or wind turbine), their
1See the Rural Solar Homes in India (www.tatabpsolar.com), the Solar Homes program in Bangladesh
(www.gshakti.org), the Solar Village program in Ethiopia (www.solarsenegal.com) and the Folovhodwe
Village Project in South Africa (http://www.hedon.info).
2Source - Image provided by www.panasonic.net based on data from IEA (2010).
3For example, the Grameen Shakti (founded by Professor Muhammad Yunus, who won the Nobel
Peace Prize for providing micro-loans to poverty-stricken households) provides micro-loans to households
in remote part of Bangladesh to install its Solar Homes kits in homes and payback in easy instalments.Chapter 1 Introduction 3
Figure 1.2: Recent initiative are focused on providing the remote communities with
(in particular renewable) microgeneration infrastructure.
power output (e.g., 1kW or 2kW) and the local weather condition. Also, demand for
energy in each home varies depending on the personal preferences (e.g., using a water
pump in the morning or in the afternoon) of the household and the number and type
of home appliances. This means that a home in a given community is diverse not only
in terms of its heterogeneous resources (i.e., dierent types of microgeneration units
and appliances) but also in terms of their usage (e.g., dierent energy generation and
consumption patterns).
This diversity is of little use when resources are operated in isolation for individual
home needs. However, as we will demonstrate in this thesis, by interconnecting homes
in a community, this diversity can be exploited to use these resources more eciently.
For example, consider a household which has a wind turbine that generates sucient
energy for the household's needs on normal days. However, when it is very windy, it may
generate more energy than what the household could consume or store in its battery.
If this household was connected to another household, it could utilise their battery to
store this extra energy that would otherwise be lost. Consider another example of two
homes, A and B. A has a solar panel so it generates energy during the afternoon, stores
this energy and uses it later in the evening. While agent B has a wind turbine that
normally generates energy in the evening. B stores this energy and consumes it later
in the afternoon. Now, if A and B are connected, A can transfer energy to B in the
afternoon so that B could consume this energy immediately. In the evening, B generates
energy and transfers it to A who can use it immediately. Thus, by exchanging energy,
A and B can avoid storing energy in their batteries. This is useful because no storage
device is 100% ecient and some energy is always lost when it is stored. Hence, by
reducing the need to store energy, homes can save energy that would otherwise be lost
due to energy storage losses.
The above examples demonstrate the potential advantages of energy exchange in remote
communities. However, there are no existing or o-the-self solutions that could provide4 Chapter 1 Introduction
means to enable energy exchange in remote communities. The aim of this thesis is to
investigate and propose methods through which connected homes in remote commu-
nities can exchange energy, in order to materialise the potential advantages of energy
exchange we discussed above. In the next section, we begin by identifying the research
requirements that any proposed solution, to enable the exchange of energy in remote
communities, must address for it to be useful and practical in the remote communities.
1.1 Research Requirements
In order to identify the research requirements, we next describe two scenarios and explore
the ways in which energy exchange can take place in remote communities4. In doing so,
we will identify the requirements that are essentials to enable the exchange of energy in
remote communities.
Scenario 1
Consider a group of connected homes in a remote community where each
home has a microgeneration unit (e.g., a solar panel or a wind turbine),
some energy requirements (i.e., loads) and an electric battery. These homes
wish to exchange energy in order to use their resources (e.g., generators or
storage) more eciently. At the beginning of each day, they come together
to discuss the cumulative generation, consumption and storage requirements
of the community for that day. They nd the potential energy exchange
agreements that are benecial to the community and concur with the energy
exchange agreement that is acceptable to all participants. Energy is then
exchanged according to the agreed energy exchange agreement.
Scenario 2
Consider a group of connected homes in a remote community where each
home has a microgeneration unit, some loads and an electric battery. The
electric battery has a limited storage capacity. Each household would like
to be independent in making its own energy exchange agreements with the
other households. Let us assume that a household A in the community
wishes to exchange energy with another household B over the period of a
day. This implies that A and B need to negotiate the amount of energy to
be exchanged as well as how this amount will be transferred throughout the
day. In other words, if there are n time units in a day, then A and B need
to agree on the power ow for each time unit. Therefore, A and B will need
4We note that these scenarios are designed to be broad and applicable to typical remote communities.
Nevertheless, energy exchange is not limited to these scenarios and there may be other ways in which
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to negotiate over multiple issues. Now, at the beginning of a day, either A
or B initiates the negotiation by making an energy exchange oer (i.e., the
power ows in each time unit of the day). If needed, the other party makes
a counter energy exchange oer. Negotiation ends when both A and B agree
on an energy exchange oer or when it reaches the deadline.
Now, we identify the common research requirements in both scenarios. The rst re-
search requirements originates from the very characteristics of remote communities. As
we mentioned earlier, the remote communities are marked with the lack of centralised
infrastructure such as power supply networks (e.g., the electricity grid) and communica-
tions networks (i.e., the internet). Absence of such basic infrastructure means that the
remote communities may not have the online banking or monetary payment systems that
are taken for granted in urban areas, which in turn, hinders the possibility of automated
nancial payments between homes in a remote community. One way to get around this
problem is the use of micro-transactions through mobile phones. For example, some
mobile network operators in Kenya oer a mobile-phone based money transfer scheme
(called M-Pesa) that allows people to transfer money or pay utility bills via their mobile
phones. This scheme has been tremendously successful in Kenya (17 million subscribers
as of 2011) and in Tanzania (5 million subscribers as of 2013). However, there are two
drawbacks of relying on mobile payments. First, such services are not ubiquitous and are
only available in few developing countries. For example, such schemes are not available
in Ethiopia where 85% of the population does not have access to electricity5. Second,
these services rely on mobile network coverage and it is estimated that a quarter of the
world population (i.e., 1.75 billion people) does not have access to mobile phones and it
is no coincidence that this population lives in the remote parts of the world6. Therefore,
solutions that rely on nancial transactions will not be suitable in the context of remote
communities. Thus, the rst research requirement is to develop solutions that do not
depend on monetary payments between homes.
In addition, a number of requirements arise when households in remote communities
interact with each other in order to exchange energy. For example, each household is
an individual entity that is interested in its own welfare (i.e., self interested). Thus,
it is natural that a household will only exchange energy if it could gain some bene-
t or some utility. Otherwise stated, participating in an energy exchange should be
individually rational for every household involved. Furthermore, when more than one
energy exchange agreements are feasible, each self-interested household will prefer the
exchange agreement that gives it the highest utility. This leads to a conict where no
single energy exchange is preferred by all households. However, their interests may not
always be completely misaligned and there may be some exchange agreements that give
5The Telecompaper - dated November 22, 2012 - available at
www.telecompaper.com/news/ethiopian-pm-seeks-safaricom-expertise-on-m-pesa-service.
6The World Bank press release - dated July 17, 2012 - available at
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some utility to all participants. In these cases, the households can negotiate and agree
on an exchange agreement from the set of such exchange agreements. However, such
negotiation can be fairly dicult and complex for a human to carry out. For exam-
ple, identifying all the mutually benecially exchange agreements in a very large set of
feasible exchange agreements is computationally complex which makes it dicult and
laborious to seek a consensus among households. A better approach is to automate this
process by requiring minimal or no human input. Thus, there is a need for automatic
negotiation.
Besides the requirement that all participants should receive some benet when they
exchange energy, the received benet to each participant should be comparable or fair
to others' in some regard. For example, the received benet to a participant should
reect their comparatively usefulness in the overall energy exchange. A solution that
favours a particular participant without a good reason will not be acceptable to other
participants. In addition to fairness, the basic motivation of energy exchange is to
ensure that resources are used more eciently, compared to when there is no exchange.
One related measure in this context is whether the outcome (i.e., the energy exchange
agreement) is Pareto-optimal. An outcome is Pareto-optimal when no participant can
get more utility without reducing another participant's utility. For example, if there
is some unused energy that is of no importance to any participant but one, then it
must be allocated to that participant, otherwise the agreed energy exchange will not be
Pareto-optimal.
Another important requirement is the scalability of a given energy exchange solution.
Scalability in this context can be dened as a measure of how well a particular solution
performs with respect to the number of participants willing to exchange energy. The
number of households in remote communities depends on several factors and can be up to
a few hundreds. For instance, a typical remote village in India has 98 homes (Government
of India, 2011). Thus, a practical solution should be applicable to a community of at
least a couple of hundred homes.
So far, our research requirements are applicable in the two scenarios that we discussed
earlier. While both scenarios describe energy exchange in remote communities, the
dynamics of the actual process through which energy exchange takes place are distinct.
In particular, Scenario 1 has a notion of collectiveness where the focus is on a group
of households that wish to exchange energy. On the contrary, Scenario 2 describes
a situation where each household wishes to negotiate and exchange energy with the
other households, on its own. This individualistic approach poses further challenges.
For example, in Scenario 1 when the entire community comes together to decide on
energy exchange, the generation and consumption of each individual may be assumed
as common knowledge. This, however, may be dicult to assume when negotiation
is left to individual households as, otherwise, every household would need to know
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self-interested household may lie while negotiating with other households, in order to
gain an unfair advantage. In such cases, a great deal of eorts is required by the
participants to plan and tackle dishonest behaviour of other participants and avoid being
a victim. Such eorts may result in households devising a plethora of strategies, making
the negotiation process complex and the outcomes unpredictable. A better alternative
is to design the negotiation process such that only a handful strategies are useful to
households, especially, those strategies where dishonest behaviour is not rewarded. This
not only makes it easier for households to negotiate without the need to plan for dishonest
behaviour but also makes it easier to predict the outcome of such negotiation. We refer
to this property as the overall stability of the negotiation process. Moreover, unlike
some negotiation processes where such properties (e.g., stability or reduced complexity)
are achieved with the help of an independent and impartial mediator with sucient
computational power (Hattori et al., 2007; Ito et al., 2007), we require the stability in a
decentralised manner without the use of a mediator. This is because, owing to the lack
of infrastructure, such mediators may not exists in a typical remote community.
Building on the discussion so far, the following list summarises our general requirements
for solutions that address the problem of energy exchange in remote communities.
REQ 1. Automated Negotiation
We are interested in automated negotiation with minimal or no human input.
REQ 2. No Payment Mechanism
The solution must not depend upon payments between participants.
REQ 3. Individually rational
A solution must be benecial to all those participating in an exchange. Participants
are self-interested and will not take part in an exchange if it is not benecial for
them.
REQ 4. Fair
The benet each participant receives should be fair (e.g., based on individual
contribution) according to pre-agreed criteria.
REQ 5. Pareto-optimal
The solution must lead to Pareto-optimal outcomes.
REQ 6. Timely
The solution should be computable in a reasonable amount of time.
REQ 7. Scalable
The solution must be scalable from a minimum of two homes to a few hundred.
Moreover, the solutions that enable individual homes to negotiate over energy exchange
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REQ 8. Stability
The solution should encourage the participants to adhere to certain strategies by
ensuring that no participant has an incentive to deviate from them.
REQ 9. Decentralised
The solution must be applicable in decentralised settings, i.e., it should not require
a mediator.
Against these research requirements and the need of enabling energy exchange in both
scenarios, we part our problem of enabling energy exchange into two problems as follows:
The Cooperative Energy Exchange Problem
The cooperative energy exchange problem refers to the scenario where house-
holds in a remote community wish to exchange energy in a collective manner,
in order to ensure the optimal use of their resources. An acceptable solution to
the cooperative energy exchange problem is the solution that addresses research
requirements [REQ 1] to [REQ 7].
Denition 1.
The Negotiated Energy Exchange Problem
The negotiated energy exchange problem refers to the scenario where house-
holds in a remote community wish to exchange energy by negotiating directly
with each other, in order to ensure the optimal use of their resources. An accept-
able solution to the non-cooperative energy exchange problem is the solution
that addresses research requirements [REQ 1] to [REQ 9].
Denition 2.
Having dened the research requirements along with the problem of cooperative and
negotiated energy exchange, in the next section we discuss the challenges that arise as
we develop our energy exchange solutions.
1.2 Research Challenges
In this section, we discuss the key challenges in addressing our research requirements.
In so doing, we identify the knowledge domains where such requirements are common.
We introduce and discuss such candidate disciplines and describe their relationship with
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The rst requirement states the need for automation in negotiation [REQ 1] which
suggests the use of software agents. A software agent is dened as a computer program
that acts on behalf of a user. Unlike a typical software program, an agent is not invoked
or executed for a specic task; rather they activate themselves (Jennings et al., 1998).
These agents incorporate information about their surroundings and their goals to operate
in an autonomous, goal-driven and intelligent manner. Such agents are called intelligent
agents and a group of such agents interacting with each other or with the surrounding
environment is called a multi-agent system (MAS).
The multi-agent system paradigm is a natural t for modelling our research problem. For
instance, each household can be modelled as a self-interested agent and therefore, a com-
munity can be represented as a multi-agent system. Multi-agent systems are naturally
decentralised [REQ 9] and are scalable [REQ 7] as a single MAS may contain hundreds
or even thousands of agents, and robust as, in general, an individual agent's failure does
not undermine the whole system function (Wooldrige, 2009). These characteristics make
multi-agent systems a strong candidate to model our problem.
Besides the multi-agent model of homes in a community, we also need to analyse how
these self-interested agents may interact with each other in order to exchange energy.
The dynamics of such interactions between self-interested agents have been studied in
great detail in the eld of game theory (Osborne, 2003). Game theory attempts to
mathematically capture the behaviours of players in situations where outcomes depend
on the actions of all players. It also provides the solution concepts such as the Nash
equilibrium or the Shapley value (see Chapter 2) to predict the outcome of such interac-
tions. In Section 1.1, we hinted that in order to exchange energy, agents can either form
a group or negotiate with individual agents. Game theory comes handy in both cases
as it provides the notions of cooperative games and non-cooperative games to analyse
these scenarios. More specically, the cooperative game theory can be used to analyse
the type of groups or coalitions that agents may form to exchange energy in a collective
manner as well as how the resultant utility can be distributed among them, i.e., the pay-
o for each agent (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008, p.367). On the other hand, when
an agent needs to negotiate an energy exchange with another agent (e.g., by making
oers to each other), the non-cooperative game theory provides methods and solution
concepts to analyse the strategic interactions (e.g., what oers the agents will make)
and the potential outcomes.
Strategic negotiation between agents is more challenging when it involves a time hori-
zon as agents are then required to take into account their own and their opponents'
potential moves over the entire time horizon. Bargaining theory can be useful here as
it provides a number of bargaining models to model these situations (Muthoo, 1999)7.
7We note that there is no dierence in bargaining or negotiation in general. The agents community
leans towards the term negotiation while economists tend to use bargaining. We keep this convention
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For instance, the Rubinstein's bargaining model (Rubinstein, 1982) explores strategic
bargaining between two players who take turns to make oers to each other to divide
a shared resource. Rubinstein showed that under certain assumptions such as complete
information (i.e., the utility or discount rate of agents are common knowledge) their
model leads to an equilibrium (to be precise the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, see
Chapter 2).
Although, the existing strategic bargaining models are promising in some domains, it is
challenging to apply them in domains where their underlying assumptions such as com-
plete information, innite time horizon or linear utility functions do not hold (Gerding,
2004, p. 32). In reality, such assumptions are generally absent and, consequently, it
becomes extremely complex to carry out a systematic game-theoretic analysis.
One approach to deal with this complexity is to simplify the settings in which agents
interact with each other. For example, Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) studied auto-
mated negotiation between self-interested agents and the eect of the environment on
their interactions. They formulate a principled framework within which they study the
interactions of agents under dierent rules of encounter, i.e., negotiation protocols. They
seek to design the protocols for these negotiations such that a society of agents, as a
whole, exhibits desirable properties such as stability (e.g., Nash equilibrium)[REQ 8]
and eciency (Pareto-eciency) [REQ 5]. Careful design of such rules prevents the
agents from being able to exploit the system and also reduces the overall complexity
of interaction for the agents. However, they conclude that there is no universal set of
rules or protocols and every domain needs to be studied in isolation to design desirable
protocols for that domain.
Designing rules of encounter for the domain of energy exchange is fairly complex because
negotiation over energy exchange not only involves multiple issues (see Scenario 2) but
also these issues are interdependent on each other. We explain this as follows:
Building on Scenario 2 where an agent needs to negotiate multiple issues (i.e.,
the power ows in each time unit of a given duration), consider a single time
unit where an agent needs to transfer a certain amount of energy to another
agent (i.e., the outward ow for that time unit). This outward ow depends
on how much energy this agent produces and how much energy this agent
withdraws from its battery, in that particular time unit. However, the energy
withdrawn from a battery in a time unit depends on how much energy had
been stored or withdrawn in all earlier time units. In this sense, the amount
of energy stored or withdrawn in a single time unit has a cascading eect on
all the later ows from the battery. Since, any outward ow in a time unit, is
dependent on the power from the battery in that time unit, all outward ows
are now dependent on how the battery was used in the earlier time units.
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of the battery makes inward and outward ows interdependent. This hinders
and agent's ability to negotiate on ows in separation with each other. In
other words, the agent is now required to negotiate all issues simultaneously.
This example shows that negotiation over energy exchange is an interdependent multi-
issue type of negotiation in our case. Hence, designing the rules of encounter for this
domain is more challenging.
From our discussion so far, we conclude that the problem of energy exchange is dif-
cult and challenging. The existing state-of-the-art provides a good starting point to
investigate this challenge but there is no o-the-shelf solution for our specic problem
at present.
1.3 Research Contributions
The primary aim of the research presented in this thesis is to address the problem
of cooperative and negotiated energy exchange in remote communities as dened in
Section 1.1. To this end, we have developed: (i) a cooperative energy exchange solution
where agents can form coalitions to exchange energy and (ii) an interdependent multi-
issue negotiation protocol to facilitate negotiation over energy exchange, as follows.
To address the cooperative energy exchange problem we developed a coalitional model
of a remote community where agents can form coalitions and exchange energy to reduce
their overall battery usage (Chapter 4). We show that each agents's contribution can be
estimated via a cooperative solution concept (i.e., the Shapley value). We empirically
evaluate our solution and show that:
1. Overall battery usage in a typical remote community can be reduced by nearly
65%, compared to when the community do not exchange energy.
2. Energy eciency can be increased by up to 10% in general cases, compared to
when the community do not exchange energy, depending on the overall battery
usage and battery eciency.
3. By approximating the Shapley values, we can scale up our solution to be applicable
to communities with hundreds of home.
4. Exchange becomes more useful as batteries become less ecient with regular use.
In addition to this, we have formulated a decentralised model of a remote community and
developed an interdependent multi-issue negotiation protocol to facilitate decentralised
energy exchange in remote communities (Chapter 5). Our negotiation protocol restricts
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1. Agents can negotiate energy exchange agreements with multiple agents in a de-
centralised, concurrent and timely fashion.
2. Agents have a strategy prole in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Section 2.3.2
for the denition).
3. Negotiation under our protocol leads to Pareto-optimal outcomes (within the re-
stricted set of outcomes).
Our work has also resulted in a software development framework called the Smart Home
Framework (SHF). The SHF simplies the modelling, prototyping and simulation of
smart infrastructure (i.e., smart home and smart communities). It provides the buildings
blocks (e.g., home appliances) that can be extended and assembled to build a smart
infrastructure model. The SHF is available online as a free and open-source framework
as detailed in Appendix 1.
Finally, this work has resulted in the following publications (in chronological order):
Muddasser Alam, Alex Rogers, and Sarvapali D. Ramchurn. Towards a Smart
Home Framework. In the 5th ACM Workshop On Embedded Systems For Energy-
Ecient Buildings, Rome, Italy, 13-14 November 2013.
Muddasser Alam, Alex Rogers, and Sarvapali D. Ramchurn. Interdependent multi-
issue negotiation for energy exchange in remote communities. In Association
for the Advancement of Articial Intelligence (AAAI) Conference on Articial
Intelligence, Bellevue, WA, USA, 14-18 July 2013.
Muddasser Alam, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, and Alex Rogers. Cooperative energy
exchange for the ecient use of energy and resources in remote communities. In
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AA-
MAS), Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA, 6-10 May 2013.
[Winner of the AAMAS2013 Best Student Paper Award.]
Muddasser Alam, Alex Rogers, and Sarvapali D. Ramchurn. A negotiation pro-
tocol for multiple interdependent issues negotiation over energy exchange. In
Proceedings of the AI for an Intelligent Planet, AIIP Workshop, pages 1:1{1:6,
New York, USA, 2011. ACM.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows:Chapter 1 Introduction 13
 Chapter 2 describes the background on topics that are related to this thesis. We
describe technologies that can enable energy exchange in remote communities,
in particular, we discuss microgeneration, energy storage and microgrids. We
then discuss related concepts from cooperative game theory, bargaining theory
and negotiation protocols. Finally, we provide an overview of the interdependent
multi-issue negotiation and the existing work on energy exchange.
 In Chapter 3, we present an agent-based model of a household in remote commu-
nity. This model incorporates renewable generation, energy storage and energy
consumption. We describe how agents can use this model to optimise their use of
battery to improve their utility. We then show how this model can be extended to
include a connection box that can connect an agent to the community so that it
can negotiate and exchange energy. Finally, we discuss the origin and collection of
our experimental data that we use in the next chapters to evaluate our solutions
to the energy exchange problem.
 Chapter 4 presents a coalitional model of a remote community. We show how
agents can form a coalition and exchange energy to reduce the overall battery
usage. We also show how the Shapley value can be used to calculate each agent's
contribution and how the approximated Shapley value can be used to scale this
solution to hundreds of agents. We empirically evaluate this solution and show
that a remote community can reduce their overall battery usage by 65%, compared
to when the community do not exchange energy.
 Chapter 5 presents a decentralised model of a remote community. We then dis-
cuss our decentralised negotiation protocol that regiments the exchange of oers
between agents so that they may come to mutually acceptable energy exchange
agreements or disagree altogether. We prove that when negotiating via our pro-
tocol, agents have a set of strategies in equilibrium such that no agent has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from it. We also prove additional properties (e.g.,
Pareto-optimality and tractability) of our protocol. Finally, we set up a typical
remote community using real world data to evaluate our negotiation protocol and
show that in this instance a community of agents can reduce the overall usage of
their batteries by 37% compared to when agents do not exchange energy.
 Chapter 6 presents our conclusions and discusses the theoretical and practical
implications of our work as well as future work.Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we provide a background on topics related to this thesis. The nature
of this thesis requires us to provide an introduction to the hardware technologies that
underpin our vision of energy exchange in remote communities, as well as to acquaint the
reader with the general background on topics that lay the foundation of our theoretical
work. We begin with the technologies that enable energy generation and storage in
homes and that which establishes a network of homes. We then provide an introduction
to selected topics in cooperative game theory, bargaining theory, design of negotiation
protocols and existing work on energy exchange. In the nal section, we summarise and
discuss the shortcomings in existing work.
2.1 Technologies to Enable Energy Exchange
In this section, we introduce three technologies that are essential to our vision of energy
exchange. We discuss the advancements and current trends in these technologies with an
aim to provide the reader with an overview of the state of the art to show that existing
technologies are adequate to enable exchange of energy in remote communities.
We begin by identifying which technologies can enable energy generation in homes in
rural communities. We then discuss the storage devices in homes by considering the
current research in this direction. Finally, we explore how homes in remote communities
can be connected to form a power-supply network.
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2.1.1 Microgeneration
Microgeneration is an umbrella term for any small-scale production of heat and/or elec-
tricity from a low carbon source1. It includes energy generation from small wind tur-
bines, photovoltaic solar panel, geo-thermal, micro-CHP (combined heat and power),
micro-hydro, fuel cells and biomass burners. Microgeneration units can be used for en-
ergy generation in homes and the related literature points to many obvious advantages
of microgeneration over large-scale generation. For example, micro-CHP units are used
for on-site electricity generation in homes. These units burn gas to generate electricity
and during this process heat is produce as a by-product. This heat, which is generally
wasted in large-scale generation (e.g., nuclear plants give o this heat through their
iconic cooling towers), can be utilised for space heating. Microgeneration also avoids the
transmission loss which occurs in large-scale generation where some energy is lost during
transmission from the point of energy generation (e.g., nuclear plant) to the point of
use (e.g., homes). Microgeneration equipment such as wind turbines, solar panels and
micro-CHP (combined heat and power) units are reliable and need little maintenance.
Energy in homes can be generated in a number of ways. However, on-site generation
of energy by renewable energy resources such as solar panels, wind turbines and micro-
CHP units have received the most attention due to comparatively low installation cost
and existing infrastructure (Abu-Sharkh et al., 2006). However, solar panels and wind
turbines are more wide-spread in rural communities while micro-CHPs are popular in
urban areas (see Section 1). Since, our focus is remote communities, we will limit our
discussion to solar panels and wind turbines.
A photovoltaic (PV) solar panel consists of interconnected photovoltaic cells (or solar
cells) which convert solar radiation (sunlight) to electricity via the photovoltaic eect.
The power output is measured in Watts (W) or kiloWatts (kW) and depends on many
factors such as the number, size and eciency of solar cells and their exposure to radi-
ation. Solar panels in remote communities come in a number of power congurations
depending on the primary purpose of the generated electricity. For example, for a solar
panel to provide power to a low-power light source such as LEDs (light-emitting diode),
the power output needs to be in order of a few watts while the solar panels used to meet
the power requirements of a home would at least be a few hundred Watts2.
Wind turbines are used to convert the kinetic energy from the wind into mechanical
energy which is then converted to electrical energy using a dynamo. The power output
from a wind turbine depends on the design, blade lengths, altitude and turbine eciency
(Bahaj et al., 2007). A typical domestic wind turbine can provide 400W to 5kW3.
1Energy Act 2004 - Section 82, UK available online at www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004.
2http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk
3Some domestic wind turbines are listed here at renewableUK - www.bwea.com/small/cases.html,
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As we mentioned, solar panels and wind turbines are popular options for on-site gener-
ation in rural communities. We take this into account in the later chapter, especially
when we model homes and communities.
2.1.2 Energy Storage Devices
Microgeneration units such as solar panels and wind turbines generate energy under
certain conditions. For example, solar panels can generate energy only in daytime while
wind turbines generate energy when wind blows above a certain speed. For this reason,
microgeneration units are often coupled with a storage device to ensure that energy is
available when energy generation is not feasible. A storage battery is also useful to
provide a constant and regulated output when power is intermittent. For example, the
power output from a wind turbine is intermittent and varies depending on the wind
speed.
Energy can be stored in many forms but we focus on technologies that can be utilised
on a domestic scale. In general, energy storage devices in homes are reported to be
electric batteries and thermal storage (see DTI (2004)). The projects that are focused
on empowering remote communities typically use electric batteries to store electricity
generated by solar panels or wind turbines.
Generally, an energy storage device is assessed in two terms, storage capacity and power.
Storage capacity refers to the total amount of energy that can be stored in the device
while power is the charging and discharging rate of the energy from/to the device.
Storage capacity is measured in Watt-hours (Wh). The charging/discharging rate or
power of a battery is the rate of ow of energy and we measure it in Watts (W).
The storage capacity and the discharging rate depends on a number of factors. For
example, in a ow-cell battery which stores electrical energy in the form of chemical
energy, it may depend on the underlying chemical reaction, the nature and amount
of chemicals or even the size and design of a battery. Therefore, the storage capacity
and power rates dier from device to device. Electrical storage devices for homes have
capacities between 5kWh to 10kWh with 1-3kW power (DTI, 2004, p. 9).
Another related topic is the advent of electric vehicles which are seen as an integral
part of the transition to a low-carbon economy (Rogers et al., 2012). When electric
vehicle (EV) batteries are used for the purpose of electricity storage at home, the storage
capacity could be up to 50kWh with 20-50kW power (DTI, 2004, p. 9). Modern
vehicles such as the Tesla Roadster from Tesla Motors, the E6 from BYD and the Zhong
Tai from Zotya are examples of vehicles with a battery pack of 50kWh. The storage
capacity of these are comparable to the average demand of 40kWh per day per person for
transportation (MacKay, 2007, p. 204). However, given the interest in electric vehicles
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cost goes down. In fact, the cost of manufacturing batteries is estimated to go down by
35% from 2009 to 2020 (BCG, 2010).
It may come as a surprise that the advent of the EVs and their ever-increasing storage
capacities have implications for energy storage in remote communities. This is because
there is a growing interest in providing the o-grid communities with used electric bat-
teries (Cready et al., 2003; Chaitanya et al., 2011), in particular, used EV batteries
(Hein et al., 2012; Onar et al., 2012)4. Such projects hint at the possibility that, in near
the future, remote communities may have used EV batteries and thus access to larger
storage capacity.
In addition to capacity and power, storage loss is another important characteristic of a
battery. In principle, when energy is stored it is converted from one form to another.
For example, when electricity is stored in an electric battery it is actually converted
into chemical energy and then converted from chemical to electric energy when needed.
This conversion is not 100% ecient and some part of the energy is lost during this
conversion (usually in the form of heat). This storage loss could be up to to 24% in
lead-acid batteries in some cases (Stevens and Corey, 1996). We also note that the used
EV batteries may exhibit similar losses as these batteries have reduced storage eciency
after some years of use.
We consider the existing types of batteries and their characteristics (e.g., capacity and
storage losses) in our community model. We assume homes in the community to be
equipped with various electric batteries (see Section 3.4.3). This ensures that our model
is in line with the existing technologies.
2.1.3 Microgids
Microgrids are small-scale power supply networks that are designed to provide power for
small communities. The idea behind them is the use of localised power generation (also
called distributed generation) to meet the local energy demands in an ecient manner
with or without the grid (Chowdhury et al., 2009).
Microgrids have been around for a long time and many of its underlying technologies such
as power engineering, network topology, communication protocols and control theory are
mature and in most cases have industry-wide standards5. For our purposes, it is sucient
to take a broad perspective on these technologies and discuss the technologies by which
a microgrid can (i) connect homes together into a power supply network and (ii) enable
communication between them so that they could negotiate to energy exchange.
4Also, See the PHEV/EV Li-on Battery Second-Use Project
www.nrel.gov/vehiclesandfuels/energystorage and Nissans 4R Energy Project for its LEAF
EV battery re-use www.nissan-global.com/EN/NEWS/2011/1107.html.
5Interestingly, Thomas Edison's rst power plant constructed in 1882 - the Manhattan Pearl Street
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A home can be connected to another entity (i.e., another home or the microgrid) via a
physical link (e.g., an electric wire at the bare minimum). However, microgrids often
employ transmission technologies such as mains communications or power line digital
subscriber link (PDSL) that can simultaneously transmit electricity and data. Also,
microgrids support a number of network topologies in which its constituent entities can
be linked together. For example, homes can be connected in a bus topology where all
homes are connected together by a shared link, much like the way homes are connected in
the grid (to be precise, distribution part of the grid). Another example is a peer-to-peer
(P2P) topology where homes have direct connections to one another, thus establishing
a network from the ground up without the need of a centralised infrastructure (see
Figure 4.1) and Figure 5.1 for examples of a bus and P2P topology).
In addition, microgrids also oer standard communication protocols that homes can
use to communicate and negotiate energy exchange with each other. Example of such
communication protocols include IEC 61850 and object linking and embedding for process
control (OLEPC).
Based on this discussion, we conclude that existing microgrid technologies are adequate
to establish a network of homes and enable to them to communicate in order to exchange
energy.
2.2 Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative game theory is a sub-eld of game theory where groups of players are taken
as primitive and binding agreements can be made (Osborne, 2003). The focus is on
what a group of agents can achieve collectively rather than on what players can achieve
individually. Cooperative game theory abstracts away from the rules of the game and
is mainly concerned with nding a solution given a set of feasible solutions.
To demonstrate an example of where cooperative game theory can be useful, consider
some energy consumers where each consumer is subscribed to an individual electricity
tari from a company. They can form a coalition together which gives them more power
to negotiate for a better deal (e.g., discounted taris)6. This generates a surplus (e.g.,
money) which they can divide among the group. Cooperative game theory is useful in
such scenarios because it can be used to predict (i) which coalitions will form (ii) how
to divide the surplus among the participants.
The questions of what coalition(s) will form is typically answered by describing the
stability of a coalition. A coalition is stable when no subset of agents can unilaterally
improve their utility by forming a subgroup. In general, the assumption is that if a
6A similar example is the Big Switch initiative by Which?, a consumer rights group in the UK.
In 2013, they grouped together over 37,000 people to negotiate a better deal from electricity and gas
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subgroup of agents can do better on their own, they will form a coalition themselves.
Otherwise, a grand coalition will form consisting of all agents. The surplus, on the other
hand, can be distributed using one of the cooperative game theory solution concepts
such as the Shapley value (introduced later in this section).
Based on the nature of surplus generated (i.e., utility), cooperative games can be divided
into transferable utility (TU) or non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In TU games, the
utility is transferable if one player can losslessly transfer part of its utility to another
player. For instance, in the above example, the discounted taris yield in monetary
savings which can be easily transferred among agents7. On the other hand, consider
an example where a professor cooperates with a student to write a paper8. Both will
obtain some benet from writing the paper, but the benet that student obtains may
well be much greater than the professor's, simply because the value added to student's
career is greater than the value added to professor's, and the benets that the student
obtains (enhanced reputation, scientic credibility, standing in the eld) cannot easily
be transferred from the student to the professor9. TU games have received more atten-
tion in cooperative game theory as a majority of games can be modelled in this class
(Chalkiadakis et al., 2011a, p.71). Since TU games are related to our work (see Chapter
4), the following discussion and formulation is focused on TU games.
Formally, a TU game consists of two elements: (i) a set of players and (ii) a characteristic
function. A characteristic function denotes the worth of a coalition, i.e., it species the
value created by dierent subsets of players (i.e, coalitions) in the game. In the case of
TU games, this value is a number. Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the nite set of players and
let v denote the characteristic function that associates every subset of S  N with a
number, i.e., v : 2N ! R, then v(S) can show the worth of the coalition S.
The characteristic functions are often assumed to be superadditive (Owen, 1995, p.213).
This implies that the total value of a union of disjoint coalitions in no less than the sum
of coalitions' individual values, i.e., for S  N and T  N such that S \T = ;, we have
v(S [ T)  v(S) + v(T).
Given a coalition and its value, we have the challenge of how to divide the value among
the players. Cooperative game theory oers the notion of a solution concept that we
could use to divide this coalition. A solution concept is a vector x 2 RjNj that represents
the allocation to each player in N. Cooperative game theory proposes a number of
solution concepts based on the perception of what constitutes a fair solution. For
example, a solution concept that allocates two symmetric players (i.e., they have identical
attributes or contribute the same towards the coalition) dierent shares, is not considered
7Of course the assumption here is that players value money in a similar fashions. The games where
agents value money dierent are not TU games.
8This is an adapted example from Chalkiadakis et al. (2011a).
9We assume that the student in question is not marking undergraduate exams papers in return.20 Chapter 2 Background
a fair solution. In the following, we describe some commonly found notions in cooperative
solution concepts (see Osborne (2003) for a more comprehensive list).
1. Individual Rationality
No player receives less than what they could get on their own.
2. Eciency
The sum of distributed pay-os of all agents equals the total value of a coalition.
3. Symmetry
Two identical players receive identical pay-os.
4. Zero allocation to dummy players
A dummy player (player that does not contribute anything to the coalition) receives
zero value.
Now, a number of solution concepts exist in cooperative game theory (see Chalkiadakis
et al. (2011b) for a list), however, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1952) has received sig-
nicant attention and has been applied to numerous domains and we discuss it in the
following section.
2.2.1 The Shapley Value
Lloyd Shapley presented his solution concept known as the Shapley value in 1952 to
the problem of allocating payments to players in a coalition. The Shapley value takes
into account the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition. Utilising the notation
introduced in Section 2.2, let Nn(i) denote the set of players without the player i and
v : 2N ! R denotes the characteristic function then the marginal contribution of player
i dened as: v(N) v(Nn(i)). In words, the marginal contribution of a particular player
is the amount by which the overall value created would shrink if the player in question
were to leave the game.
Given the marginal contribution, the Shapley value i for a player i 2 N is dened as:
i(N;v) =
X
SNn(i)
jSj!(jNj   jSj   1)!
N!
[v(S [ i)   v(S)] (2.1)
The Shapley value is shown to be individually rational, ecient, symmetric and allocates
zero payments to dummy players (Shapley, 1952). Despite the obvious advantages,
computing the Shapley value is known to be computationally complex (2n  2  O(v),
where O(v) is the complexity of the characteristic function) and it becomes increasingly
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is often #P-Complete (Fatima et al., 2008). To overcome this limitation, some studies
suggest the use of sampling methods to approximate the Shapley value and we discuss
them next.
2.2.2 Approximating the Shapley Value
Notable work on approximating the Shapley value includes Owen (1972) and Fatima
et al. (2008) (see Fatima et al. (2008) for a comprehensive overview). However, these
works are focused on specic classes of games and are not applicable to general cases. In
contrast, Castro et al. (2009) have recently presented their ApproShapley algorithm for
the polynomial-time calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling10. The number
of samples their algorithm needs to approximate the Shapley value depends on three
factors (i) the error (bound) of the approximation, (ii) an upper bound on the variance
of the marginal contributions (iii) and the failure probability of this bound.
One of the main advantages of ApproShapley is its applicability to a large class of games
(Castro et al. (2009) presents example of dierent classes of games to demonstrate this),
in contrast with the earlier works that focus on a specic class of games. We exploit this
general applicability of ApproShapley and utilise it to approximate the Shapley value
to enable cooperative energy exchange in larger communities (see Chapter 4).
This concludes our discussion of the basic concepts of cooperative game theory. We now
move on to its applications in the electricity grid domain.
2.2.3 Cooperative Game Theory in the Electricity Grid
Cooperative game theory has a long history of application to electricity generation and
transmission in the electricity grid. For instance, Yeung et al. (1999) used coopera-
tive game theory to model the trading process between market entities that generate,
transmit and distribute power while Contreras and Wu (2000) proposed the use of the
kernel solution concept for building stable coalitions to bear the costs of the transmission
network expansion.
More recently, the smart grid vision has revitalised the application of cooperative game
theory in the electricity grid. Smart grid is described as a fully automated power deliv-
ery network that monitors and controls every customer and node, ensuring a two-way
ow of electricity and information between the power plant and the appliance, and all
points in between (of Energy, 2003). The smart grid is also envisioned to utilise the dis-
tributed energy resources (DERs) that in recent years have appeared in the electricity
10ApproShapley runs in polynomial-time if the characteristic function can be evaluated in polynomial
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network. Such DERs range from electricity storage devices to small and medium capac-
ity renewable energy generators (Chalkiadakis et al., 2011b). This decentralised nature
of the smart grid, along with the interaction of heterogeneous resources, elicit poten-
tial cooperation from self-interested participants to obtain their goals more eciently.
For example, energy generation from the renewables energy sources is associated with
uncertainty which challenges their integration into the grid. A number of studies have
applied coalitional game theory to counter this challenge. For instance, Pudjianto et al.
(2007) and Robu et al. (2012) suggest that aggregating DERs into virtual power plants
can improve cost-eective and reliable integration of DERs into the smart grid.
Although, these works apply cooperative game theory to power network for various
goals, none have considered enabling energy exchange in such networks. This shows
that despite the similarity of cooperation for the ecient use of resources, our work is
innovative in achieving this goal via energy exchange (see Chapter 4).
2.3 Bargaining Theory
Bargaining theory is focused the bargaining process and its outcomes, collectively re-
ferred to sometimes as the bargaining problem. The bargaining problem can be stated
as:
Two individuals have before theme several possible contractual agreements.
Both have interests in reaching agreement but their interests are not entirely
identical. What will be the agreed contract, assuming that both parties
behave rationally? (Rubinstein, 1982)
This seemingly simple problem has challenged economists for decades before the ground
breaking work of Nash (1950a) which takes an axiomatic approach to predict the outcome
of the bargaining problem, and much later Rubinstein (1982) which takes a strategic
approach to predict the outcome, tackled this challenge. These works followed a number
of axiomatic and strategic bargaining solutions and we next provide an overview of them.
2.3.1 Axiomatic Bargaining
Axiomatic bargaining is considered to be focused on the bargaining outcome and its
properties but not the bargaining process (Roth, 1979). It proposes to choose an outcome
based on agreed axioms that it must satisfy. Depending on the agreed axioms, there
may be a unique solution or multiple solutions, in the set of all possible solutions, that
satisfy these axioms. The most common axioms found in the literature (see Roth (1977)
for a comprehensive list) are as follows:Chapter 2 Background 23
1. Invariance to equivalent utility representations
This axiom is also known as invariance to ane transformation or scale-freeness.
This refers to the characteristics that the bargaining outcome should be invariant
to how each agent values its share. In other words, rescaling an agent's utility
should not change the bargaining solution.
2. Pareto-optimal solution
A Pareto-optimal solution is a solution where no player can improve its utility
without making any other player worse o. The set of all such solutions describes
the Pareto-frontier of a bargaining problem.
3. Symmetry
The solution should depend only on the utility function of the agents, not on the
identity of agents. In other words, symmetric utility functions should result in
symmetric pay-os.
4. Independence from irrelevant alternatives
This axiom states that if a certain choice A is preferred over B in a choice set S
then the inclusion of another choice C, must not make B preferable to A.
In the following sections, we discuss some axiomatic bargaining solutions and discuss
the axioms they satisfy.
2.3.1.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) (Nash, 1950a, 1953) is an axiomatic bargaining
solution to the two-player bargaining game in which each player has a personal value
(i.e., utility) for some goods which are to be divided. Furthermore, the players have
a disagreement value which represents their utility if no cooperation takes place (i.e.,
when players fail to reach an agreement).
Assuming two players A and B, the set of all solutions is a plane while the set of feasible
solutions S is a subset, or graphically, a subplane within this plane. The subplane S
has the pair of disagreement values (da;db) as one vertex and Nash assumes this set to
be compact11. and convex12. Any point (ua;ub) in the set S describes the individual
shares of agents, and since agents will only cooperate if they get more utility than their
disagreement values, (da;db)  (ua;ub) must hold.
11A set is compact if it is closed and bounded.
12A set C is convex if for all x and y in C and all t in the interval [0;1], the point (1  t)x+t(y) is in
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Figure 2.1: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. The solid line is the
Pareto-frontier. The origin is taken as the disagreement point (i.e., (da;db) = (0;0)),
thus all the acceptable agreement must lie above this point. This region is called the
feasible region and any point in it shows the player utility, i.e., (ua;ub). The dashed line
represents the Nash product of the players utility (i.e., (uaub) since (da;db) = (0;0)).
Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (K-S) is the dashed-dotted line. The maximum
utility that agent A can get is at the point (ua

;0) while the maximum utility for agent
B is at (0;ub

). The point (ua

;ub

) shows the maximum utilities of agent A and B.
We draw a line K-S from the disagreement point to (ua

;ub

). The K-S solution lies at
the point where this line intersects Pareto-frontier.
If x and y are the shares of agent A and B respectively, then the Nash bargaining
solution is obtained by:
argmax
x;y
[ua(x)   ua(da)]  [ub(y)   ub(db)] (2.2)
where x and y denote shares of A and B respectively and da;db are the disagreement
value of agents A and B respectively. The solution to Equation (2.2) (i.e., the values of
x and y which maximise this equation) are the shares of agents A and B respectively.
Equation (2.2) is also called the Nash product. If the feasible solution set S is convex and
compact, then the solution to this equation is unique (see Nash (1953) for the proof).
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the Nash bargaining product. The Nash bargaining
solution satises all the axioms dened in the last section.Chapter 2 Background 25
2.3.1.2 Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution
The fourth axiom (independence from irrelevant alternatives) has been a topic of con-
troversy as it has been described as a very restrictive axiom for a solution (Roth, 1977).
This axiom describes that if two players prefer a solution in a solution set S then they
must prefer the same solution in a subset of S, provided that solution exists in the
subset of S (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, it has been shown that adhering to this
axiom may make a player less satised with its utility when the solution set is enlarged
(see Luce et al. (1958, p.128) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) for examples of such
cases)`. The Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) is
an extension to the Nash bargaining solution that does not conform to this axiom.
To compute the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, we need to form a rectangle in the solution
space S. The four points of rectangle are obtained as follows. The rst point is the set
of disagreement values (da;db). The second point is (ua
;0) where ua
is the maximum
utility that the rst player can make. The third point is the maximum utility for the
second player i.e., (ub
;0). The last point lies at (ua
;ub
). Then a line is sketched from
the point (da;db) to (ua
;ub
). The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the point where it
intersects the Pareto-frontier, as shown in Figure 2.1.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has been shown to be a good choice when the fourth
axiom (independence from irrelevant alternatives) is not important (see Roth (1979) for
a discussion and examples).
2.3.1.3 Utilitarian Solution
The utilitarian solution in axiomatic bargaining theory is used to divide a shared utility
between two or more players. The shares of agents are calculated by maximising the
following equation:
argmax
x;y
[ua(x) + ub(y)] (2.3)
The utilitarian solution satises axioms 2, 3 and 4 but not the rst axiom (invariance to
equivalent utility representation). This can pose a problem in situations where agents
have considerable dierence in their utility functions because the utilitarian solution
will give the goods to the agent that values it the most and the other agents will get
no share. On the other hand, in situations where agents are not self-interested, the
utilitarian solution can be a good choice as it maximises the overall group utility by
giving the goods to the agent which has the highest utility for them. For this reason,
this solution is also referred to as the social welfare solution.26 Chapter 2 Background
Axiomatic bargaining suers from the absence of detailing the bargaining process i.e.,
describing how the participant will arrive at a particular axiomatic solution. In the next
section, we describe strategic bargaining that takes the bargaining process into account
in order to predict the outcome.
2.3.2 Strategic Bargaining
Strategic bargaining is focused on the bargaining process through which players reach
an agreed outcome. This is achieved by describing the bargaining problem as a game
where the exact bargaining process is detailed (e.g., the order in which agents make
oers) and then predicting the outcome by analysing the strategies of the agents (e.g.,
what oers agents will make). The goal of such analysis is to discover a strategic equilib-
rium to determine rational outcomes of bargaining. Some widely-used solution concepts
such as the dominant strategies, the Nash equilibrium and the subgame Nash perfect
equilibrium, are applied from non-cooperative game theory and we dene them in the
following.
Dominant Strategy
A dominant strategy is optimal in all circumstances, that is, the strategy
achieves the highest pay-o no matter what the strategies of the other players
are.
Denition 3.
Nash Equilibrium
A strategy prole is said to be in Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive
to unilaterally change her action
Denition 4.
It is obvious that the Nash equilibrium is a weaker notion of equilibrium than the
dominant strategy. However, its power comes from the fact that Nash proved that
every nite game has at least one equilibrium point (Nash, 1950b). A renement of a
Nash equilibrium is Selten's subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for extensive form game.
Extensive form games are the games where players can make decisions at various stages
of the game.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is de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Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Strategies in an extensive-form game are in subgame perfect equilibrium if they
constitute a Nash equilibrium at every decision point.
Denition 5.
Another related concept in strategic bargaining is the notion of a bargaining protocol
which species the rules that govern the bargaining or negotiation process. The bar-
gaining protocol that has received the most attention is the alternating oers protocol
where agents take turn to make oers. Perhaps the most inuential work on the alter-
nating oers protocol is Rubinstein's pie dividing problem (Rubinstein, 1982). The pie
problem refers to the bargaining situation where two players have to reach an agreement
on the partition of a shared resource (pie). Both players make oers and counter-oers
to suggest how it should be divided. When a player makes an oer, the other player
must either accept it or reject it and continue with the bargaining. Rubinstein assumes
that players have complete information, can make unlimited alternating oers and that
delays are costly for both parties. Rubinstein's bargaining process can be modeled as
a dynamic game and solved by using the backward induction method (for a detail dis-
cussion, see Muthoo (1999)). The general idea of the backward induction method is
to determine the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the game.
Then, the optimal action of the next-to-last moving player is determined taking the last
player's action as given. The process continues in this way backwards in time, until it de-
termines the Nash equilibrium of each subgame of the original game, hence determining
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
Although the alternating oers protocol is one of the most popular and most inuential
models of bargaining in general (Wooldrige, 2009), there are cases where other negotia-
tion protocols are suitable and even cases where new negotiation protocols are developed
which we discuss next.
2.4 Designing Negotiation Protocols
The alternating oers protocol, despite its applicability to a wide range of systems, is
not always the best choice. For example, the general alternating oer protocol allows
agents to make unlimited alternating oers, putting a question mark to whether the
negotiation will ever terminate. In such situations, the monotonic concession class of
negotiation protocols is useful as it guarantees a termination.
A monotonic concession protocol proceeds in rounds. In the rst round, both agents
simultaneously propose a deal from the negotiation set. In the subsequent rounds, each28 Chapter 2 Background
agent is required to oer a deal that gives its opponent more utility than the last oered
deal. An agreement is reached if one agent makes a proposal that its opponent rates
at least as high as its own current proposal. If neither agent makes a concession in a
round, the negotiation terminates. In both cases, negotiation is guaranteed to terminate
eventually (Endriss, 2006).
Similarly, the requirements and attributes of the negotiation process derive the choices
or, when necessary, design of a negotiation protocol. For example, negotiation protocols
have been proposed for bi-lateral multi-issue negotiation (see Fatima et al. (2006) for a
discussion) and for multi-player single-issue negotiation (see (Binmore, 1985, p.269-304)
for a discussion on n-player negotiation). More recently, Wu et al. (2009, 2011) presented
a multi-player multi-issue negotiation protocol with complete information where rational
players bid sequentially in consecutive rounds till a deadline to agree on a resource
allocation for all. They show that, under their protocol, agents have a set of strategies
in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. While their work extends state-of-the-art in multi-
player multi-issue negotiation protocols, it is not applicable to negotiations where issues
are interdependent.
Another line of work in designing negotiation protocols for multi-agent systems, is Rosen-
schein and Zlotkin's work (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). They formulate a principled
framework within which they study the interaction of agents under dierent rules of
encounter (or protocols). They seek to design these rules of interaction for such that a
society of agents, as a whole, exhibits desirable properties such as stability (e.g., Nash
equilibrium), eciency (Pareto-optimality) and simplicity in interaction. Agents inter-
act with each other in a decentralised manner obeying the rules of encounter.
The idea of specifying rules of encounter to simplify the negotiation process, is very
useful when agents are required to carry out computationally complex tasks during the
negotiation (e.g., calculating the optimal oer from a large set of oers). Enforcing
a specic set of rules can reduce this computational complexity and enable agents to
interact in a timely manner. Moreover, we can design the rules of encounter to inuence
the strategies that agents can use. For instance, Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) present
some examples of negotiations where an individual agent cannot gain any advantage by
deceiving (i.e., lie about their private information) in negotiation, compared to when
they are honest. In such scenarios, agents have a set of strategies in equilibrium from
which no agent has an incentive to deviate, and they refer to this property as stability.
Indeed, as discussed in Section 1.2, this is an important property as it prevent agents
from wasting their time in devising deceptive strategies.
Although this approach seems very promising in simplifying negotiation, there are chal-
lenges in applying them to the domain of energy exchange. First, as Rosenschein and
Zlotkin (1994) conclude, there is no universal set of rules that induces stability in general
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for it. This motivates our work to design a negotiation protocol for the domain of
energy exchange as this domain has not been explored under this approach. Second,
negotiation over energy exchange involves interdependent multiple-issues and that is re-
garded as more challenging than the multiple independent issues that are considered by
Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994).
Based on our discussion so far, we conclude that there is a need to design a interdepen-
dent multi-issue protocol for the domain of energy exhcange that could guarantee certain
desirable outcomes (i.e., stability or Pareto-optimality). We note that this requires a
game theoretic analysis of the interdependent multi-issue negotiation. We also note
there is some contemporary work that looks at interdependent multi-issue negotiation
from a heuristic point of view and we discussed it next.
2.5 Heuristic Approaches to Interdependent Multi-Issue
Negotiation
Negotiation with interdependent issues is considered as very dicult and complex (Robu
et al., 2005). Some recent work takes on this problem by focusing on either eliminating
the interdependence (between issues) or by utilising a mediator to help in nding a
solution. The rst approach taken by Hindriks et al. (2006) attempts to approximate
the utility space in order to eliminate interdependencies. The general idea is to transform
the utility space of multiple interdependent issues to an approximated one with multiple
independent issues. It is fairly obvious that the degree of approximation is entirely
dependent on the transformation and, indeed, they conclude that their transformation
technique is only reliable when the issues are not highly dependent. In other words, it
is only reliable when merely a few issues are interdependent in multi-issue negotiation.
This severely limits the applicability of this technique to the problem where all issues
are interdependent. For example, in an exchange with multiple time period (e.g., ft1,
t2, t3g), the energy ow in one time period (say t2) is dependent on the ow in all other
time periods (i.e., t1 and t3). Therefore, this technique is not applicable in our problem
where issues are highly interdependent.
Negotiation over interdependent issues poses another challenge; in comparison to multi-
issue negotiation, it is much harder and time-consuming for agents to learn the pref-
erences and utility of their opponents due to the complex utility space. Learning the
preferences of opponents is important because it helps agents make oers which give
the opponents at least some utility, which in turn increases the chances of reaching an
agreement within the deadline while reducing the negotiation time and communication
cost (Weiss, 1999, p. 272). Some works suggest the use of a central authority to assist in
negotiation and some examples of recent work on this track is Hattori et al. (2007), Ito
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mediator (with sucient computing power) to which agents provide information about
their utility functions. This mediator then uses stochastic optimisation to calculate a
number of Pareto-optimal solutions which provide both agents some utility. The agents
can then choose a solution from this set which makes it easier to negotiate. However,
this approach requires the presence of an unbiased and independent mediator, capable of
carrying out intensive computations. Such assumptions rarely hold in our decentralised
setting where there is no centre and households are required to negotiate directly with
each other.
Based on this discussion that heuristic approaches to complex negotiation, though ap-
plicable in certain domains, do not focus on the game theoretic analysis and do not
guarantee properties such as equilibrium strategies, we conclude that these works are
not applicable to our problem of energy exchange.
2.6 Existing Work on Energy Exchange
The existing literature on the problem of energy exchange is the exclusive outcome of
works by Rusuunen and Ehtamo (Ehtamo et al., 1987, 1988; Ruusunen et al., 1989;
Ruusunen, 1994b; Ehtamo and Ruusunen, 1995)13. They considered a group of utility
companies where each company owns generators and uses them to satisfy the energy
demand of its customers. The cost of energy generation was dierent for each company
and varied over the course of a day (they assumed that this cost can be veried to veracity
by an auditor). They showed that in this scenario, companies can be connected together
to form a power pool to exchange energy in order to reduce the overall generation cost.
To keep this exchange optimal (Pareto-optimal) and fair, they use the Nash bargaining
solution concept which calls for the maximisation of the product of gains (i.e., the
increment in their utilities due to this exchange) of all companies. Their core result is
to show that companies can meet their demands more eciently when they exchange
energy. However, their approach is not applicable in our case for three reasons. First,
they only consider controllable microgeneration (diesel generators) which can be turned
on/o on demand, unlike in our setting where microgeneration can be uncontrollable
(solar panels or wind turbines are examples). Second, their analysis does not consider
the possibility to store energy. Third, their solution depends on monetary payments
which renders it useless when payments are not feasible.
Rusuunen and Ehtamo's work, though not applicable in our settings, validates the use-
fulness of energy exchange in general.
13Some variations (see Ehtamo et al. (1989b,a); Ruusunen et al. (1991); Ruusunen (1992, 1994a)) of
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2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the literature related to the problem of energy exchange
between homes. We began with the technologies that are essential for energy exchange
and found that much of the needed technologies, such as microgeneration and storage
devices, are already in use. Furthermore, continued research in these areas is constantly
improving these technologies. We conclude that the building blocks of our vision of
energy exchange in homes are in place, making this vision practical.
We discussed concepts from cooperative game theory as well as their application to
the electricity grid. However, none of the existing works explore the idea of energy
exchange. Nevertheless, this literature points to techniques that we can use to address
our cooperative energy exchange problem.
To address the problem of negotiated energy exchange problem, we discuss bargaining
theory, in particular, its strategic aspect. We presented some bargaining protocols and
showed that a straightforward application of these protocols is not possible to the domain
of energy exchange. We then discuss works that suggest simplifying the negotiation
settings and designing negotiation protocol to guarantee desirable outcomes. However,
there are no universal negotiation protocols for every domain and we need to design an
interdependent multi-issue negotiation protocol for energy exchange. We also concluded
that the contemporary works on interdependent multi-issue negotiation is applicable in
few scenarios and lack a game theoretic analysis to guarantee properties like stability.
Based on the overview of existing works, we conclude that, at present there is no o-
the-shelf solution to the problem of energy exchange between homes. However, we
can utilise concepts from cooperative game theory to address the cooperative energy
exchange problem and insights from bargaining theory and negotiation design to develop
a negotiation protocol that addresses the problem of negotiated energy exchange.Chapter 3
Model of a Home in Remote
Community
In this chapter, we develop a model of a home in remote community and discuss how
homes in a remote community can be connected. More specically, we rst present
a home model and describe how energy generation, consumption and storage can be
incorporated together in this model for the optimal use of energy. We then describe
how a home model can be connected to the community via a connection box. Finally,
we discuss the collection of our experimental data which we use to evaluate our energy
exchange solutions.
3.1 Home Model
This section describes our home model in detail along with the basic components and
assumptions that we make. Our home model is an agent-based model similar to the
models presented by Vytelingum et al. (2010) and Ramchurn et al. (2011). Our home
model consists of a microgeneration unit, appliances and an electric battery which are
controlled by an agent. Figure 3.1 illustrates our model along with its components and
notation. We assume that the agent has access to all the relevant information, such as
energy generation and consumption times, required to control the home, as follows.
3.1.1 Generation and Load
The generation capability of an agent refers to the maximum power that the agent
expects its microgeneration unit to generate. Let t 2 Nt
0 divide a continuous length of
time into t time periods and let g = (g1;:::gt) j g 2 Rt
0 denote the generation capability
of an agent over t. For example, if gi = 5 then it means that an agent expects to
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generate 5kWh in i time period. In practice, there may be some uncertainty over the
exact amount generated but at this stage we ignore this factor.
We use h = (h1;:::;ht) j h 2 Rt
0 to denote the load in t time periods. This load refers to
all appliances that consume energy1. Here, each entry refers to the total energy required
in a single time period. For example, hi = 5 denotes a load of 5kWh in i time period.
3.1.2 Generation and Waste
We note that g denotes the energy that can be generated. However, an agent may reduce
the amount of energy generated in some cases. For example, when the generated energy
can neither be used immediately nor stored due to the limited battery ow or capacity
(see Section 3.1.3). Similarly, when an agent exchanges energy (see Section 3.3), it may
receive some energy from another agent which it can neither use immediately nor store.
To model such scenarios, we refer to the energy that is available at a given time but
cannot be used, as wasted energy and denote it by w = (w1;:::;wt) j w 2 Rt
0. For
example, wi = 2 shows that 2kWh of energy was available at time period i to an agent
which it could neither use immediately (i.e., to satisfy a load) no store in the battery.
3.1.3 The Battery
We characterise our battery with four parameters. The rst is its maximum storage
capacity, which is denoted by s 2 R0 and refers to the maximum amount of energy
that can be stored in the battery, measured in kWh. The second is the maximum charge
rate of the battery which is denoted by cmax 2 R0 and measured in kW. The third is
the maximum discharge rate of the battery, denoted by dmax 2 R0 and measured in
kW. Finally, the eciency of the battery is denoted by e 2 [0;1] and it describes the
loss of energy when the battery is charged. For example, with a 90% ecient battery
1kWh of electricty may ow into it to charge it, but only 0.9kWh can be used (the rest
being lost as heat).
While in use, the dynamic state of the battery is described in terms of energy ow into
and out of it and the energy stored. We denote the energy ow into the battery (charge)
by c = (c1;:::;ct) j c 2 Rt
0 and the ow going out (discharge) d = (d1;:::;dt) j d 2 Rt
0.
Since the charging or discharging ows are assumed to be constant in a given time
period, the amount of energy stored in the battery constantly changes during a time
period (exceptions are the time periods where there is no inward or outward ow).
Therefore, we use q = (q1;:::;qt) j q 2 Rt
0 to denote the stored energy at the start of
each time period.
1We model battery as a storage facility and not as a load that needs to be satis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Figure 3.1: An agent-based model of a home in remote communities. The link ow
f (see Section 3.3) describes the ow on the physical link.
3.1.4 Energy Allocation
A battery enables an agent to store and use energy throughout a day, which helps the
agent compute an energy allocation, p = (p1;:::;pt) j p 2 Rt
0. An energy allocation pi
describes the energy that is to be consumed to satisfy load hi at i time period, thus, it
can be considered as a t time periods plan to satisfy loads. We note that for a given
time period i, the amount of energy available to an agent depends on the its generation
capability (gi), charging (ci), discharging (di) and wasted energy wi for that time period,
as follows.
pi = gi + di   ci   wi i 2 t (o1)
We, also note that the allocated energy pi should never exceed the load hi (i.e., an agent
cannot consume more energy that its demand for a given time period), as follows.
pi  hi 8 i 2 t (o2)
3.1.5 Utility Function
We describe the utility of an agent for a given time period i as the load that is powered
(i.e., allocated energy pi) at time period i. The overall utility for an agent is the sum ofChapter 3 Model of a Home in Remote Community 35
all satised loads in t time periods, given by2:
u =
t X
i=1
pi (3.1)
It is evident that the more the load is powered, the greater the utility. Therefore, the
goal of a utility-maximising agent is to power as much of its load as possible. In other
words, the goal of an agent is to use its battery to store its generated energy such that it
can meet the maximum possible load in order to obtain maximum possible utility. This
corresponds to seeking an energy allocation (p) that maximises the utility, which we
discuss next.
3.2 Optimal Energy Allocation
A utility-maximising agent can nd the energy allocation p that maximises its utility
as follows:
p = argmax
p
t X
i=1
pi (3.2)
This can be transformed to a linear programming (LP) model with the following con-
straints:
Constraint 1: At time i, the allocated power pi, depends on the generation capability
gi, charging ci, discharging di and wasted energy wi:
pi = gi   ci + di   wi 8 i 2 t (o1)
Constraint 2: The current battery state, qi, depends on the last battery state, q(i 1),
charge c(i 1) and discharge d(i 1). The charging ow ci 2 c is subjected to the battery
eciency e. Also, the rst state of the battery, q1, must equal the last battery state of
the battery qt to ensure there is no net change of battery charge over the day so that
the utility remains dependent only on the energy generated in t time periods:
qi =
(
q(i 1) + e  c(i 1)   d(i 1) ; i > 1
qt + e  ct   dt ; i = 1
(o2)
2We note that more complex utility functions can be constructed, such as those where loads are
dened in terms of appliances with certain characteristics (deferrable or non-deferrable) or where some
loads are preferred over other loads. However, as we show in Chapter 5, this utility formation is useful
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Constraint 3: Allocated power pi must not exceed load hi:
pi  hi 8 i 2 t (o3)
Constraint 4: The battery state qi must not exceed the maximum capacity s. Also, the
battery state cannot be negative, i.e., energy must be stored before it is drawn:
0  qi  s 8 qi 2 q (o4)
Constraint 5: At any time period i, charging ow ci must not exceed the maximum
charge limit cmax. Also, the charge ow is always positive:
0  ci  cmax 8 ci 2 c (o5)
Constraint 6: At any time period i, discharge ow di must not exceed the maximum
discharge limit dmax. Also, the discharge ow is always positive:
0  di  dmax 8 di 2 d (o6)
Now, an agent can compute an energy allocation p which maximises its utility via
Equation (3.2) subjected to constraints fo1;:::;o6g.
This completes our discussion of agent-based home model and optimal use of energy. In
the next section, we discuss how an agent can be connected to homes in a neighbourhood.
3.3 Connecting a Home to the Outside - The Connection
Box
In order to connect a home to the outside world (e.g., community or another home)
we introduce the notion of a connection box in the home. The connection box contains
the basic circuity that is required to connect a home to the outside so that it could
transfer and receive energy as well as data. To give an analogy, this connection box
can be thought of as a network router which connects a modern home to the outside
(i.e., the internet) for data transmission. This assumption of a connection box makes it
easier to conceive how homes can be connected together. For example, we can consider
two homes connected if their connection boxes are connected together, i.e., there is a
physical link in between. Note, that this physical link will transmit both power and
data, much like the mains communication that we introduced in Section 2.1.3.
When connected, the available power to an agent also includes the electricity ow on
its link (in short link ow). To capture the dynamics of this 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f = (f1;:::;ft) 2 Rt describe the total ow on the physical link. The direction of the
ow is denoted by the sign of the quantity (i.e., a positive quantity shows the ow coming
into the house) while a negative quantity shows the ow in reverse direction. Now, at
any given time, the power available to the connected agent includes the ow on this link
at this time. We can modify our constraint (o1) to capture this link ow as follows:
Constraint 7: At time i, the allocated power pi, depends on the generation capability
gi, charging ci, discharging di, wasted energy wi and link ow fi:
pi = gi   ci + di   wi + fi 8 i 2 t (o7)
We assume that the maximum ow on the link is constrained by its physical properties
and we denote the maximum possible ow on this link by fmax 2 R.
Constraint 8: At any time period i, the link ow fi must not exceed the maximum link
ow fmax allowed on the physical link.
 fmax  fi  fmax 8 fi 2 f (o8)
This concludes the discussion of our agent-based home model. We next describe the
collection of our experimental data that we use to evaluate our solutions to the problem
of energy exchange.
3.4 Data Collection
As we described in Section 1, energy exchange is only useful when there is some diversity
(e.g., generation, load, preferences) among agents in a society. While this diversity may
exist in a number of ways (e.g., battery capacities or microgeneration output), we limit
our discussion to diversity in generation times (i.e., when two agents generate dierent
amount of energy in a given time period) in order to show the benets that energy
exchange may oer. In the following chapters, we use this data to evaluate our proposed
solutions for energy exchange (see Section 4.3 and Section 5.12).
3.4.1 Energy Generation
We assume that each agent in a remote community has a microgeneration unit, either
a 2.5kW wind turbine or a 3.5kW solar panel. These power ratings are inline with our
discussion on existing microgeneration technologies in homes (Section 2.1.1). To model
generation from these microgeneration units, we collect two energy generation datasets
from Lugo, Spain as follows.38 Chapter 3 Model of a Home in Remote Community
3.4.1.1 Dataset 1: Energy Generation From Wind Power
Our rst energy generation dataset comes from a wind farm in Lugo1. This data set
contains energy generated (in mega Watts hours) from wind turbines in hourly intervals
for the month of July 2011. To match the sampling interval of our half-hourly load
data set (see Section 3.4.2), we divide each hourly generation into two equal half-hourly
energy generation. We then scale this data to match output from a 2.5 kWh wind
turbine so that we have half-hourly generation in kWh for every day in July, 2011.
3.4.1.2 Dataset 2: Energy Generation From Solar Power
To estimate the power output of a 3.5 kW solar panel, we use the solar irradiance data
in Lugo, since the power output of a solar panel is directly proportional to the solar
irradiance2. This dataset consists of 48 data points where each data point is the half-
hourly, average daily solar irradiance (i.e., of all days in July, 2011). We then scale
this data to match the output of a 3.5kW solar panel. In this way, we can estimate a
generation prole, gsolar, which consists of half-hourly power output of a 3.5 kW solar
panel on an average day in July, 2011. Figure 3.2(b) shows gsolar.
3.4.1.3 Choosing a Day for Energy Exchange Simulation
To meet our requirement of diversity in generation (see Section 3.4), we select one specic
day (6th July, 2011) as our simulation day because the energy generation from wind and
solar power is mostly non-overlapping on that day (see Figure 3.2(a) (see Figure 3.2(b))3.
We denote the generation from wind power on 6th July by gwind. The diversity between
generation times in gsolar and gwind creates an opportunity for energy exchange. We
note that gwindis spread unevenly over the day (Figure 3.2(a)). There are peaks in the
early morning and late evening (time periods 1-10 and 32-40) and some time periods
where output is very low or zero (e.g., time periods 14-24). The total energy generated in
gwind is 24kWh. Contrary to gwind, the generation in gsolar(Figure 3.2(b)) is evidently
limited to day time only (time periods 13-37 which corresponds to 06:30-18:30 in real
time) with most of the energy produced from 1100 to 1600 (time periods 22-32). The
total energy generated in gsolar is 24.5kWh (0.5kWh more than gwind).
3.4.1.4 Gaussian Distributions over Datasets
To model generation for each agent in a community on our simulation day, we draw the
generation of each agent as follows:
1Available at www.sotaventogalicia.com
2Available at www.re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvgis/apps/radday.php
3See Section 5.12, for an empirical discussion of energy exchange on other days in July, 2011.Chapter 3 Model of a Home in Remote Community 39
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(a) gsolar, Generation from solar power in July, 2011
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(b) gwind, Generation from wind power on July 6, 2011
1. At time period i, the generation gi of each agent that has a solar panel is drawn
from a normal distribution gi  N(gsolar
i ;gsolar
i =10), where gsolar
i 2 gsolar. This
ensures that gi is within 10% of gsolar
i .
2. At time period i, the generation gi of each agent that has a wind turbine is drawn
from a normal distribution gi  N(gwind
i ;gwind
i =10), where gwind
i 2 gwind.
We note that the generation prole of each agent is drawn ahead of simulation so each
agent is has prefect knowledge of its generation.
3.4.2 Loads
Unfortunately, the statistics on renewable energy use in rural areas of developing coun-
tries are not being collected systematically (Martinot, 2011, p.65). An indirect way is to
anticipate which appliances a typical home is likely to have and how often a household
is likely to use them. However, the nature of appliances dier in remote communities
based on several factors such as their geographical location or livelihood. For example,
people who live near a lake or river do not need irrigation pumps to extract water from
underground. The other challenge with this approach is that once a reliable source of
energy supply establishes, the demand is likely to grow (e.g., radios can be replaced by
television) rendering such estimates irrelevant.
To avoid these pitfalls, we focus on the load requirements of low-income homes in the
UK which is recorded and provided by a UK electric company3. This enables us to
estimate the daily load requirements of an average low-income home in the UK which
we take as the representative of a typical home in remote community.
Figure 3.2 shows this load over the course of a day. We observe that the consumption
increases in the morning time (time periods 15-17 which corresponds to 07:30-08:30)
3We are not permitted to name the company due to contractual reasons.40 Chapter 3 Model of a Home in Remote Community
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Figure 3.2: Daily load requirements of a low-income home.
when the households get ready to leave for school or work, and stabilises in the afternoon
(time period 18-32) mainly due to the household chores. It reaches the peak in the
evening (36-42 which corresponds to 18:00 to 21:00) when the households come back
and power-hungry devices (such as the TV or electric kettle) are switched on. The total
load for a day is 26.68kWh.
We note that unlike the energy generation proles that come from distributions, load
requirements are assumed to be identical for all agents. This helps us demonstrate that
diversity in generation times is sucient for energy exchange to be useful, as well as to
explain the role of other parameters (such as battery capacity) in our simulations.
3.4.3 The Battery
Following our discussion on contemporary electric batteries in Section 2.1.2, we assume
that each agent has an electric battery. As mentioned in Section 3.1, we characterise a
battery with 4 attributes, maximum capacity (s), maximum charging rate (c), maximum
discharging rate (d) and eciency (e). Towards this end, we consider that agents may
have one of the following batteries:
1. B1 (s = 6kWh , c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
2. B2 (s = 8kWh , c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
3. B3 (s = 12kWh, c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
4. B4 (s = 20kWh, c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
The specication of this battery has been chosen with three objectives in mind. First,
such specications have already been used in work on microstorage in homes (see
Vytelingum et al. (2011)). Second, they reect the increasing practice of utilising theChapter 3 Model of a Home in Remote Community 41
used EV batteries at homes in o-grid communities (Section 2.1.2). Third, the bat-
tery specications dier only in the battery capacity which gives us the opportunity to
investigate the role that the battery capacity plays in energy exchange.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an agent-based model of a home in remote communities.
This model consists of renewable generation, energy storage and load requirements. We
describe how agents can use this model to optimise their use of battery to improve their
utility. We then show how this model can be extended to include a connection box
that can connect an agent to the outside world, so that it could negotiate and exchange
energy. Finally, we discuss the collection of our experimental data that we use in the
next chapters to evaluate our solutions to the energy exchange problem.Chapter 4
Cooperative Energy Exchange via
Coalition Formation
Having outlined our basic home model and its connection to the community, in this
chapter, we apply coalitional game theory to the problem of energy exchange. We begin
by modelling a community of connected homes as a coalition of agents that wish to
exchange energy to reduce their overall battery usage. We then show how each agent's
contribution can be computed by their respective Shapley value or by the approximated
Shapley value in larger communities. Finally, we empirically evaluate our coalitional
solution to demonstrate its benets for the ecient use of energy and resources in remote
communities.
4.1 Connecting Homes Together
In Section 3.1 we described an agent-based model of an individual home and how this
self-interested agent can be connected to the outside world via its connection box.
Based on the same model, we can perceive a remote community as a collection of con-
nected agents. Connecting an agent to a community requires a physical link between its
connection box and the community. Once connected, the power available to an agent
includes the power f owing along a physical link (i.e., link ow in Section 3.3). Fig-
ure 4.1 shows an example of such a community network. We note that in this example,
homes are connected in a bus topology (introduced in Section 2.1.3) but they can be
connected in any other topology (e.g., star or mesh topology) or a combinations thereof.
We now present a coalitional model of this community.
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Figure 4.1: A community network of agents where each agent is connected to the
community via their connection box.
4.2 Coalitional Model of a Community
A community of connected agents can be considered as the grand coalition (see Sec-
tion 2.2) where the generation, consumption and storage proles of agents are common
knowledge. Agents in the community are assumed to be self-interested in the sense that
they will only exchange energy if it benets them. In other words, it must be individually
rational for an agent to participate in energy exchange.
Energy exchange can be useful in many regards (e.g., maximising social welfare or man-
aging uncertainty in renewable generation) but we are specically interested in using
energy exchange to reduce the use of electric batteries. Reduction in the use of elec-
tric batteries, in our case, equates to a reduction in battery charging. As discussed in
Section 1, the reduction in storage usage has two advantages. First, a battery has a
limited number of charging cycles, so reducing its usage prolongs its life1. Second, the
less a battery is charged, the less energy is lost due to the battery ineciency. We
next formulate the problem of reduction in battery charging via energy exchange as an
optimisation problem.
4.2.1 Minimal Battery Charging
Let n be the set of agents in a community and let cj = (c(j;1);:::;c(j;t)) 2 Rt
0 dene a
battery charging needed for the optimal allocation of energy for agent j when it is not
connected (as detailed in Section 3.1). Similarly, let ^ cj = (^ c(j;1);:::;^ c(j;t)) 2 Rt
0 dene a
battery charging of j when it is connected to the community. Let Ccom be the matrix
of all charging in the community such that:
Ccom =
2
6
6
4
^ c(j;1) ::: ^ c(j;t)
. . .
. . .
. . .
^ c(n;1) ::: ^ c(n;t)
3
7
7
5
1In Lithium-based batteries, one life cycle means a full charge of the battery even when the charging
is discrete.44 Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation
where each row ^ cj represents the battery charging of agent j over t time periods. Our
intention is to reduce the overall battery charging, i.e., to nd the minimal overall battery
charging Ccom as the following:
Ccom = argmin
Ccom
n X
j=1
 
t X
i=1
^ c(j;i)
!
(4.1)
Now, Ccom dene the minimum battery charging for each agent in the community. To
make it individually rational for them to participate in energy exchange, we include the
following two constraints:
Constraint 9: Let uj 2 R0 be the utility that agent j gets when it is disconnected from
the community, and let ^ uj be the utility while connected. Then1:
uj = ^ uj 8 j 2 n (o9)
Constraint 10: Agents are also guaranteed that their battery usage will not increase.
Thus, for any agent j:
t X
i=1
c(j;i) 
t X
i=1
^ c(j;i) 8 j 2 n (o10)
Now, given Equation (4.1) and constraints (o2;:::;o12) we can nd the minimum storage
requirements of the community. We note that a by-product of reduction in storage is
energy savings and we discuss it as follows.
4.2.2 Energy Savings as a Consequence of Reduction in Battery Charg-
ing
In Section 1, we presented an example to argue that energy exchange can save the energy
that is otherwise lost without exchange. Such energy savings comes from two sources.
First, via energy exchange, agents can cut down their wasted energy (Section 3.1.2)
that would otherwise be lost due to their inability to use or store it. Second, as energy
exchange reduces the need to store energy, the amount of energy that is lost due to
energy storage losses can also reduce.
1We note that an agent's utility is merely the sum of the energy it uses (Section 3.1). While it
may be tempting to model the equality constraint o10 as an inequality uj > ^ uj, such inequality will
lead to optimal solutions where agents are given more utility (i.e., more energy), making it dicult
to estimate the potential overall energy savings (see Section 4.2.2). We, therefore, we model it as an
equality constraint.Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation 45
Figure 4.2: A community network of agents with communal infrastructure.
Now, the energy saved in a remote community can be used in various ways. For example,
it can be used to power the load requirements of communal infrastructure, such as
communal buildings (e.g., schools, medical centres, places of worship), street lights and
irrigation pumps. However, our focus here is to show that (i) energy exchange in remote
communities has the potential to save energy and (ii) to provide means to quantify the
overall saved energy as well as the contribution of each participant towards this energy
(see Section 4.2.3), as we summarise next.
Let F com represent all link ows in the community of n agents as follows:
F com =
2
6
6
4
f(j;1) ::: f(j;t)
. . .
. . .
. . .
f(n;1) ::: f(n;t)
3
7
7
5
where each row fj represents the link ow of an agent j over t time periods. To measure
the saved energy, we extend our community network model by including a link ow
fsaved (see Figure 4.2.2). This is the physical link where the saved energy is directed
to. To describe how the ow on fsaved relates to other ows, we add two constraints
as follows.
Constraint 11: The sum of all network ows (i.e., link ows of all agents and fsaved) at
time period i is zero.
n X
j=1
f(j;i) + fsaved
i = 0 8 i 2 t (o11)
Constraint 12: fsaved is always positive.
fsaved
i  0 8 i 2 t (o12)
Note, for any given time period i, some agents will either have fi > 0, which means
they have an inward ow on their physical links (i.e., coming into the house), fi < 0
meaning outward ow on their physical links, or fi = 0 which means no ow for this
time period. The sum of all these outward and inward ows at time period i is the saved46 Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation
energy fsaved
i in the community at time period i. Here, we would like to stress that the
objective of the coalition formation is to minimise the battery charging and fsaved is
merely a by-product of this optimisation.
Now, given that we can compute the minimum battery charging required for a coalition
and the energy saved in that coalition, we now describe a function that, given any
coalition, gives us a measure of its worth.
4.2.3 The Characteristic Functions
In Section 2.2 we introduced a characteristic function v that shows the worth or value
of a given coalition (i.e., v : 2N ! R and v(;) = 0 for a nite set of agents N). In our
case, agents form a coalition to reduce their battery charging, so we dene the worth of
a coalition in terms of the total battery charging. Using Equation (4.1) which computes
the minimum battery charging for a community or the overall battery charging of a
coalition, we dene a characteristic function, vc, as follows:
vc =
n X
j=1
 
t X
i=1
Ccom
(j;i)
!
(4.2)
where, vc is the sum of the matrix Ccom and shows the total amount of battery charging
required in the community. Now, Equation (4.2) can map any coalition to a number
which is the minimum battery charging required in that coalition.
As discussed earlier, a by-product of the reduction in battery charging is energy saving
(i.e., fsaved). To know the worth of a coalition in terms of energy saving, we can dene
another characteristic function2, ve, in a similar fashion to vc:
ve =
t X
i=1
fsaved
i (4.3)
where ve is the sum of the vector fsaved, and shows the overall saved energy in a
community.
It should be noted that the battery charging and saved energy for an empty coali-
tion is zero (i.e., vc(;) = 0, ve(;) = 0). Furthermore, the input arguments for both
2Note, we could assign weights to map both charging and energy values of a coalition to a single value,
say x 2 R, to denote the worth of a coalition with one value. However, this involves making certain
assumptions about the weights (i.e., essentially assuming how each agent prefers their charging over their
utility) which we avoid by keeping the characteristic functions separated. Moreover, two characteristic
functions make it easier to understand what each agent contributes separately to the overall charging
and to overall energy saving, which in turn, makes it easier to give it a fair share in both surpluses.Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation 47
Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3) are variables that are the result of optimising Equa-
tion (4.1). Thus, in order to know the battery charging and energy savings of a given
coalition, we solve only Equation (4.1) to nd the values of Ccom and fsaved.
4.2.3.1 Super-Additivity of Characteristic Functions
In Section 2.2 we mentioned that a characteristic function is super-additive when the
total value of a union of disjoint coalitions is no less than the sum of coalitions' individual
values. To demonstrate that our characteristic functions vc and ve are super-additive,
consider the following example. Let a and b be two agents with battery charging ca
and cb when they are disconnected, respectively. When there is no exchange, the total
battery usage is  Ccom = ca + cb. Now, consider that they form a coalition to reduce
their overall battery usage by exchanging energy. Thus, their goal is to nd an optimal
charging prole Ccom such that Ccom <  Ccom. Now, if there exists a Ccom :
Ccom <  Ccom, then exchanging energy is rational because it will reduce the overall
battery charging. Otherwise, these agents will never agree on exchange, otherwise stated,
they will never agree on a charging Ccom such that Ccom >  Ccom as it will increase
their battery usage. In this scenario, the status quo where they do not exchange any
energy is a better alternative (i.e., Ccom =  Ccom = ca + cb). Similarly, the same
example can be used to show that two disjoint set of agents will never exchange energy
if it increases the overall battery charging. This highlights the super-additivity of our
characteristic function vc. Now, since ve is directly proportional to reduction in battery
charging (the less the battery is charged, the less the energy is lost due to ineciency),
implies that when a coalition does better in terms of battery charging, it also improve
energy savings and thus ve is bound to increase. This shows that both vc and ve are
super-additive3.
4.2.4 Cooperative Energy Exchange as a TU game
We introduce the notion of a TU game in Section 2.2. A TU game consists of two
elements: (i) a set of players (N) and, (ii) a characteristic function that maps a coalition
to a number. Given that we have two characteristic functions, we dene two separate
games (N;vc) and (N;ve) for each characteristic function.
Having transformed the problem of cooperative energy exchange into a TU game, we
next discuss the Shapley value in such games.
3Note, the super-additivity of characteristic functions imply that agents will form the grand coalition.48 Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation
4.2.5 The Shapley Values
As discussed in Section 4.2.3, each coalition has two characteristics functions that de-
scribe its worth in terms of overall battery charging and energy it saves. Following on
from our discussion in Section 2.2.1, we use the Shapley value as the solution concept
to calculate the fair contribution of each individual agent towards the overall battery
charging and the energy saved as follows. To calculate the Shapley value for battery
charging for an agent, we can substitute vc for v in Equation (2.1):
i(N;vc) =
X
SNn(i)
jSj!(jNj   jSj   1)!
N!
[vc(S [ i)   vc(S)] (4.4)
Note, for any given S  N, we can calculate the overall battery charging vc(S) via
Equation (4.2). Now, we call i(N;vc) the charging Shapley value of agent i. This
charging Shapley value is the average contribution of agent i to the total battery charging
requirements of a community.
Similarly, to calculate the Shapley value for energy savings of an agent, we substitute ve
for v in Equation (2.1) as follows:
 i(N;ve) =
X
SNn(i)
jSj!(jNj   jSj   1)!
N!
[ve(S [ i)   ve(S)] (4.5)
Again, it is obvious that for any given S  N we can calculate the overall energy savings
ve(S) via Equation (4.3). Now, we call  i(N;ve) the energy Shapley value of agent i.
This energy Shapley value is the average contribution of agent i to the total energy
saving of a community.
We now discuss the computational aspects and approximation of these Shapley values.
4.2.6 Approximating the Shapley Values
In Section 2.2.1, we mentioned that the Shapley value is known to be computationally
complex (2n  2  O(v), where O(v) is the complexity of the characteristic function).
Since both our characteristic functions are dependent on Equation (4.1), which we for-
mulate as a Linear Program (LP), their computational complexity is polynomial-time.
Although, the LP formulation of Equation (4.1) makes it easy to compute the marginal
contribution and scales up with the number of agents (6 seconds for 100 agents), com-
puting the Shapley value for an agent becomes very challenging as we need to know
the marginal contribution of that agent to every subset of a given coalition. Therefore,
the sheer number of combinations as the number of agents increases, makes exhaustive
search impossible (e.g., computing the Shapley values for 16 agents take 21 hours in ourChapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation 49
case). In Section 2.2.2, we discussed the approaches to approximating the Shapley value
in general and in particular the ApproShapley algorithm for the polynomial-time calcu-
lation of the Shapley value based on sampling. This algorithm suits our needs for two
reasons. First, ApproShapley requires the characteristic function to be polynomial-time,
as is the case here. Second, it provide a bound on the approximation of the Shapley
value which gives a condence on the quality of solution.
We make two notes on the use of ApproShapley in our case. First, as we also mentioned
in Section 2.2.2 the number of samples required by ApproShapley depends on three
factors (i) the error (bound) of the approximation, (ii) an upper bound on the variance
of the marginal contributions and (iii) the failure probability of this bound. We set
these to (1:5;2;0:05) respectively, for the approximation to be correct within 1:5 of
the actual Shapley values, 95% of the time4. Thus, there is a 5% chance of an agent's
Shapley value being o by more than 1.55. Second, ApproShapley requires the samples
from permutations (i.e., N! if N is the set of agents) but we save on the computational
time by storing each evaluation of the characteristic function to make sure that the
unique coalition corresponding to any permutation is evaluated only once.
This concludes our theoretical part of discussion. In the next section, we empirically
evaluate our solution on real world data to demonstrate the applicability and advantages
of our idea of energy exchange in communities.
4.3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we rst describe the origin of our data that we use to evaluate our model.
We then discuss the results of our evaluation and demonstrate the usefulness of exchange
in communities. In particular, we show how exchange can be useful in dierent scenarios
by varying dierent parameters.
4.3.1 Experimental Setup
We begin by considering a community of agents where each agent is assigned a micro-
generation unit, a load and storage as follows:
Renewable Generation: Each agent has a microgeneration unit, either a 1.5kW wind
turbine or a 1.75kW solar panel with equal probability. The generation prole of each
agent that has a solar panel comes from distributions over gsolar or gwind for those that
with wind turbines, as detailed in Section 3.4.1.4.
4The upper bound on the variance of the marginal contributions, can be calculated by computing
actual Shapley values for a smaller number of agents.
5For our experiments, ApproShapley needed 112 samples per agent to ensure these requirements in
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Consumption: The daily load requirements of an agent comes from the low-income
UK household in Section 3.4.2. We note that each agent in the community has the same
load requirements; since our focus is to show the diversity in generation is sucient to
demonstrate the usefulness of energy exchange.
Storage: As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, we characterise a battery with four attributes,
maximum capacity (s), maximum charging rate (c), maximum discharging rate (d) and
eciency (e). To show the eect of battery capacity with regards to energy exchange,
we consider that each agent in the community has one of the following batteries with
equal probability.
 B1 (s = 6kWh , c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
 B2 (s = 8kWh , c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
 B3 (s = 12kWh, c = 4kW, d = 4kW and e = 90%)
Number of Agents: We initially ran our experiments for a community of 10 agents
in order to compute the exact Shapley values and to discuss the comparative variation
(and its causes) in the Shapley values of agents. We then consider a community of 100
agents (chosen to be close to the number of households (i.e., 98) in an average Indian
village (Government of India, 2011)) to show how exchange can be scaled up.
LP Solver: All linear models are solvable with a general-purpose LP Solver and we use
IBM ILOG CPLEX, a powerful optimiser, that provides easy and rich methods to model
constraints, variables and objective functions. All experiments were run on a 2.6GHz
machine with 12GB RAM.
Benchmark: To the best of our knowledge, there is no study on energy exchange in
cooperative communities that we could compare our results with. The state-of-the-art
in terms of existing o-grid communities is just the isolated homes with some micro-
generation and storage. We consider this status-quo as the benchmark and show the
comparative improvements that our solutions oers.
4.3.2 Empirical Results
In this section, we rst evaluate our model for a community of 10 agents. We compute
the exact charging and energy Shapley values for all agents. Agents get dierent Shapley
values as per their contribution and we discuss the properties (i.e., battery capacity and
eciency) that this contribution is dependent on. We then evaluate two alternative
scenarios with regards to the usefulness of energy exchange. The rst scenario examines
the eect of the diversity in generation type. The second examines the eect of reduction
in battery eciency. Finally, we consider a community of 100 agents and compute theChapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation 51
(a) Exact charging Shapley value: Agents
with smaller batteries appear to con-
tribute less.
(b) Exact energy Shapley values: Agents
with smaller batteries appear to con-
tribute more.
Figure 4.3: Comparative analysis of the charging and energy Shapley values of agents.
approximated Shapley values to demonstrate the scalability of our solution. We note
that all Shapley values discussed are exact Shapley values, unless otherwise stated.
Figure 4.3(a) shows the exact charging Shapley values for each agent in a community
of 10 agents. For example, agent 1 has a marginal contribution of 4.9kWh battery
charging, which is the average marginal increase in the overall charging that this agent's
presence causes in the community. In other words, the more the charging Shapley value
of an agent, the more charging burden it is asked to take in a community. We make
two important observations here. First, the charging Shapley values of agents with the
same battery specication, are very similar (Figure 4.3(a)). Second, agents who use
their batteries comparatively less (i.e., the sum of their charging is low) when they are
disconnected (see Figure 4.4(a) for the battery charging of agents when they do not
exchange energy), have a lower impact on the overall community charging and thus
their batteries are used less. This may seem slightly counter intuitive because one may
think that an agent with a bigger battery can be more useful to a coalition. However,
having a larger battery does not mean that an agent will be sharing more of its battery
as constraint (o10) guarantees them that their battery charging will not increase as a
result of energy exchange. This means that the charging Shapley value of an agent is
not dependent on the size of their battery. In fact, Figure 4.4(a) shows that an agent's
charging Shapley value is dependent on its actual battery charging before joining the
coalition. So if an agent charges its battery more when it is disconnected, compared
with other agents, it will have a higher charging Shapley value in the community.
Figure 4.3(b) shows the exact energy Shapley values for each agent, which is the av-
erage marginal contribution to the overall energy saving that an agent's presence in a
community results in. Again, we make two observations here. First, we observe that
agents with similar battery capacity have similar energy Shapley values. Second, the52 Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation
(a) Agents reduce their battery charging
via energy exchange.
(b) Lower battery capacity mean more en-
ergy waste (when agents do not exchange
energy).
Figure 4.4: Comparative analysis of variations and their causes in charging and energy
Shapley values of agents.
agents with smaller batteries contribute more towards the overall energy savings. This
is because the agents with smaller batteries may have more wasted energy so, joining
a coalition may help to save this energy. Figure 4.4(b) conrms this case by showing
the wasted energy and energy storage loss when agents are not connected. We can see
that the agents with smaller batteries (e.g., agents 4 and 7) have more wasted energy
compared to the agents with bigger batteries (e.g., agent 1 and 2) and therefore, agents
4 and 7 are the biggest contributors to the amount of energy saved in the community.
It is important to note that even when no agent has any wasted energy, the reduction
in their battery charging, when they exchange energy, will always yield some energy
savings unless their storage is 100% ecient.
Figure 4.4(a) shows the sum of battery charging with and without exchange for each
agent. We note that none of the agents are required to use more of their battery
(constraint (o10) ). Put together, constraint (o9) (the utility of a participating agent
will not decrease), and constraint (o10) guarantee that it is individually rational for
them to participate in energy exchange.
Figure 4.4(a) shows the sum of battery charging with and without exchange for each
agent and we note that the sum of battery charging of all agents without exchange
is 93.8kWh which drops to 33.2kWh with energy exchange. This means via energy
exchange, the community reduces its overall battery charging by 64.4%.
One important aspect of energy exchange is the fact that more diversity in generation
and consumption opens up more ways to exchange energy. Although consumption can
be considerably diverse among the urban consumers depending on many factors, (e.g.,
their appliances, income, family size) it can be argued whether such diversity would existChapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation 53
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Figure 4.5: Alternate Scenarios: Energy exchange with regards to diversity in gener-
ation and battery eciency.
in remote communities. For example, many families in remote Indian villages own very
similar electrical appliances (Government of India, 2011) (e.g., lighting apparatus and
radio). This leaves little possibility for signicant diversity in consumption. However,
on the generation side, this pattern can be very dierent, depending on the renewable
generation means. For example, two homes may have similar consumption but one may
have a wind turbine while the other has a solar panel. Here, we consider two extremes,
one where all homes are equipped only with solar panels and one where they all have
wind turbines only. Figure 4.5(a) shows the percentage reduction in battery charging,
compared with the total battery charging with no exchange, and the percentage of
energy saved, compared with the total energy usage with no exchange, when energy is
exchanged. It can be seen that as the diversity in generation means increases, the agents
have more opportunities to exchange energy and to reduce their battery usage, with the
maximum reduction in battery charging with the most diversity. Here, we only present
the saved energy that comes directly from the reduction in battery charging, in order
to show that improvement in energy eciency is possible even when there is no wasted
energy in the community.
The eciency of an electric battery degrades with usage and time. The actual dynamics
of this degradation depends on a number of factors but all energy storage devices are
bound to lose their eciency over multiple charging cycles. Figure 4.5(b) shows what
happens as the batteries (of all agents) in a community become less ecient. As previ-
ously mentioned, as the battery eciency is reduced, the energy storage loss increases.
However, via exchange this energy loss can be avoided and Figure 4.5(b) shows that the
percentage of energy saved increases as the battery eciency decreases. For example,
with 90% ecient batteries, the energy savings are around 3% while for exceptionally
low ecient batteries (10% ecient) it is around 65%. However, it should be noted that54 Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation
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Figure 4.6: Computation time versus number of agents.
such low ecient batteries are far likely to be replaced or recycled and thus the energy
savings shown in Figure 4.5(b) may only be applicable in extreme cases. Generally
speaking, batteries are much more ecient (90% to 80%) and therefore energy savings
are likely to be under 10%. Moreover, we note that when the agents have very inecient
batteries (below 40%), exchange oers them 100% reduction in battery usage. This is
because with very inecient batteries, the storage losses ramp up and thus the agents'
utilities decrease signicantly. With exchange, such low agent' utilties are acheivable
easily (i.e., constraint (o9) ) without using any storage in the community.
Figure 4.6 shows how our solution can be scaled up to larger communities. In particular,
Figure 4.6 shows the comparison of computational time required to compute the Shapley
values along with the approximated Shapley values. It is obvious that calculating the
Shapley values beyond 16 agents (10.1 hours for 15 agents as shown in Figure 4.6 and it
doubles for 16 agents, i.e., 21 hours) is not feasible (in reasonable time) even when the
exchange takes place over a single day. In contrast, we can use the approximated Shapley
values for larger communities as it scales well with the number of agents. Figures 4.7(a)
and 4.7(b) show the approximated charging and energy Shapley values for 100 agents. As
mentioned in Section 4.2.6, ApproShapley needed 112 samples per agent to ensure that
the approximated values are within 1:5 range of the actual Shapley values with a 95%
condence bound. We note that our observations for Figure 4.3(a) and Figure 4.3(b)
are valid here too. In addition, the overall battery reduction for 100 agents is 69.2%
which is comparable to the community of 10 agents (64%).
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated that cooperative game theory and multi-agent systems
can be applied to the problem of cooperative energy exchange in remote communities.Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation 55
(a) Approximated charging Shapley value for 100 agents.
(b) Approximated energy Shapley value for 100 agents.
Figure 4.7: Using approximated Shapley values for large communities.
More specically, we showed that self-interested households can form coalitions to ex-
change energy in order to reduce their battery usage (by 64%) and save energy (up to
10% in general cases) that would otherwise be lost due to storage losses. We have also
shown that the fair distribution of the surpluses can be achieved either by computing
the exact Shapley value or approximated Shapley values in large communities.
Additionally, we note that our solution meets all the research requirements for the coop-
erative energy exchange problem that we laid out in Section 1.1. More specically, our
solution requires neither human input (REQ 1) nor payments between agents (REQ 2).
Furthermore, an agent is guaranteed that by participating in the exchange (i) its utility
will never decrease and (ii) its battery usage will not increase. Thus, it is individually
rational for an agent to participate in exchange (REQ 3). The fairness (REQ 4) and
Pareto-optimality (REQ 5) properties are inherited from the use of the Shapley value.
We note that any energy exchange solution that is based on exact Shapley values guar-
antees these properties, however, any solution that is based on approximated Shapley
values, is only approximately fair and Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, the use of56 Chapter 4 Cooperative Energy Exchange via Coalition Formation
approximated Shapley value ensures that the solutions takes a reasonable amount of
computation time (REQ 6) and scales up to larger communities (REQ 7).
Having presented our solution to the cooperative energy exchange problem, in the next
chapter we discuss a solution to the negotiated energy exchange problem.Chapter 5
An Interdependent Multi-issue
Negotiation Protocol for Energy
Exchange
In this chapter, we present an interdependent multi-issue negotiation protocol to enable
energy exchange in remote communities. We begin by presenting a light-weight peer-
to-peer network model of a remote community where agents are required to negotiate
directly with each other to reach energy exchange agreements. We discuss the complex
nature of this negotiation and then present our negotiation protocol that reduces this
complexity and enables agents to reach agreements in a timely fashion. We prove some
properties of our negotiation protocol and show that it is tractable, scalable and leads
to Pareto-optimal outcomes under certain conditions. Finally, we empirically evaluate
our protocol to demonstrate its potential benets in remote communities.
5.1 Connecting Homes Together
In our peer-to-peer model, a home can have multiple physical links, each connecting
its connection box to the connection box of another home. In this way, a light-weight
peer-to-peer (P2P) network can be established from the ground-up without the need of a
centralised infrastructure. This is in contrast to our coalitional community model where
a home is connected to the entire community via a single link. Figure 5.1 illustrates
a P2P community. In the next section, we provide a formal model of such a P2P
community.
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Figure 5.1: A P2P network where an agent may be directly connected to multiple
agents.
5.2 A Peer-to-Peer Model of a Community
As we mentioned in Section 3.3, the power available to a connected agent includes the
ow on its physical link. In a P2P network, an agent can have multiple links. To reect
this we modify our model in the following way.
Let M be the set of agents connected to agent a and let fj = (f
j
1;:::;f
j
t ) 2 Rt denote
the agreed ow between a and some agent j 2 M over time t. Then the total ow fi
available to agent a at time period i is:
fi = z 
X
j2M
f
j
i 8i 2 t
Here 0  z  1 is the eciency of the physical link1. We can modify constraint (o1) to
include this power in the total power that is available to a at time period i as follows:
pi = gi   ci + di   wi + fi 8i 2 t (o8)
Now, for a given ow ^ f = ( ^ f1;:::; ^ ft) 2 Rt, a can maximise its utility by using Equa-
tion (3.1) and constraint (o7) as follows:
ua( ^ f) = max
t X
i=1
(gi   ci + di   wi + ^ fi) 8i 2 t (5.1)
Where ua( ^ f) denotes the maximum utility that a can get for ^ f, subject to constraints
fo2;:::;o8g.
Now that an agent is connected to other agents, it can negotiate with them to reach an
agreed ow that increases its utility. We discuss this in the next section.
1For our experiments in Section 5.12, we have z = 0:999.Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange59
5.3 Negotiation Over Energy Exchange
We mentioned earlier that negotiation over energy exchange is a type of interdependent
multi-issue negotiation which is known to be complex (see Section 1.2). This becomes
even more challenging when an agent needs to negotiate with multiple agents, because
reaching an agreement with one agent can aect the ongoing negotiation with the others.
To facilitate negotiation in this context, we next present a protocol that reduces this
complexity and enables agents to reach agreements eciently.
5.4 Energy Exchange Protocol (EEP)
We now present our energy exchange protocol (EEP) to facilitate negotiation over en-
ergy exchange. The core idea behind our protocol is to divide agents into two power
pools, that need energy in alternate times, and impose restrictions on the negotiation to
reduce complexity. However, the ingenuity comes from the fact that these restrictions
are engineered so that the negotiation ends in outcomes with certain properties (see
Section 5.10).
Before dening the EEP, we dene our terminology. We consider exchange over nite
time (e.g., a day) which can be divided into exchange periods. An exchange period is
an atomic unit of time (e.g., 12 consecutive hours) for energy exchange and consists of
at least one time period. The EEP allows only two exchange periods (ex1 and ex2) and
divides agents into two exchange types (et1 and et2) where et1 requires energy in ex1 while
et2 requires energy in ex2. The negotiation starts with round zero where agents declare
their exchange types. Round zero is followed by oer rounds at specied times. In each
oer round, only one exchange type (called makers) is allowed to make simultaneous
oers to the other exchange type (called receivers). An oer describes the proposed
energy ow on the physical link between a maker and receiver. The EEP dictates that
all negotiated ows must be valid ows. A ow is valid if it conforms to restrictions
r1 and r2 (see Figure 5.2). The receivers are only allowed to receive oers. Having
received oers, each receiver broadcasts a valid ow fBroadcast (see Section 5.7.2.2)
that must not exceed the minimum oer it received. We denote the set of broadcast
ows of all receivers by F Broadcast. The EEP dictates that the agreed ow lAgreed
between each maker and its respective receiver in this oer round, is the minimum ow
in F Broadcast,i.e., lAgreed = min(F Broadcast)1. Given these terms, Figure 5.2 describes
the EEP in detail.
1We dene min(F) as an operation that returns the minimum ow in the provided collection(s) of
valid ows (F in this case). See Section 5.5.1 on how order in established among valid ows.60Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
Energy Exchange Protocol (EEP)
1. Negotiation starts at a specied time with round zero. In round zero, all agents simulta-
neously broadcast their exchange type. Only et1 is allowed to make oers from now on,
while et2 can only respond to those oers.
2. Subsequent oer rounds take place at specied intervals. If there are at least one maker
and one receiver that need to exchange energy, the oer rounds continue as follows:
 All makers make simultaneous oers. Each maker is required to make a valid ow
oer f 6= 0 to all receiver it is connected to. An oer f is valid if:
{ The oer comprises of exactly two exchange periods. Each exchange period
consists of an equal number of consecutive time periods. The amount of energy
exchanged in each exchange period must be the same, with opposite ows.
f = (f1;:::::ft) j
t=2 X
i=1
fi =  
t X
i=t=2+1
fi (r1)
{ The amount of energy in each time period is equal.
f = (f1;:::::ft) j 8 fi 2 f : jfij = jfi+1j (r2)
 On receiving oers, each receiver simultaneously broadcasts a valid ow f
Broadcast 6=
0 to all agents. The EEP dictates that
{ A receiver's f
Broadcast must not exceed the minimum oer it received.
(r3)
{ The agreed ow l
Agreed in this oer round is the minimum ow in the set of all
broadcast ows, F
Broadcast.
(r4)
 All receivers simultaneously broadcast a boolean signal to their respective makers to
indicate if they wish to receive oers in the next oer round.
 The current oer round terminates.
3. The EEP terminates.
Figure 5.2: The Energy Exchange Protocol (EEP)
5.5 Properties of the Valid Flows
Having outlined our protocol, we now discuss the properties of the valid ows. The
EEP denes a ow as valid if it meets restrictions r1 and r2. We denote the set of all
valid ows as SV F  Rt where t is the number of time periods2. Negotiation under the
2Examples of valid ows are (2;:::;2; 2;:::; 2), ( 1;:::; 1;1;:::;1) and (0:5;:::;0:5; 0:5;:::; 0:5).Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange61
EEP involves valid ows at all stages, i.e., makers are required to make valid ow oers,
receivers broadcast valid ows and the agreed ow is valid as well. In this sense, the
choice of ows for any participating agent is reduced from the set of all ows S to the
set of all valid ows SV F. We note that r1 and r2 are designed such that valid ows
exhibit certain desirable properties that provide the basis for us to dene the feasibility
and order of valid ows, as we discuss next.
5.5.1 Order in the Set of Valid Flows
To be able to relate and compare ows in a meaningful way, we need to describe how two
ows are related to each other. We can establish this criterion by establishing an order
on SV F where the order of a ow in f 2 SV F is based on the total amount of energy
that it exchanges. However, we note that two valid ows may transfer the same amount
of energy but in opposite exchange periods (e.g., f0 = (1; 1) and f00 = ( 1;1)). For
a participating agent, such valid ows are not the same despite the same amount of
energy they exchange. Therefore, we dene a partial order on SV F where two ows are
comparable only if they transfer energy in the same exchange period (or receive energy
in the same exchange period) as follows3.
Let f = (f1;:::;ft) 2 SV F, that denes ows over t time periods. Then the EEP requires
f to be consisted of two equal exchange periods, ex1 and ex2. Let fex1 = (f1;:::;f t
2)
describes the ows in ex1 and fex2 = (f t
2+1;:::;ft) describes the ows in ex2. Now,
f0 2 SV F and f are comparable if they have positive ows in the same exchange period.
More specically,
fi  0 =) fj  0 8fi 2 fex1;8fj 2 f0
ex1
OR
fi  0 =) fj  0 8fi 2 fex2;8fj 2 f0
ex2
Now, when two valid ows are comparable, their order is established by the amount of
energy they exchange as follows. Let F  SV F be a set of comparable valid ows and
 be a function such that4:
 : F ! R0
(f) =
X
jfij 8i 2 fex1
Therefore, if (f) = x, then x is the amount of energy that ow f exchanges.
3For example, (1; 1) is comparable to (2; 2) since both transfer energy in ex1 and receive energy
in ex2. Similarly, ( 1;1) is comparable to ( 2;2), however, neither (1; 1) or (2; 2) is comparable to
( 1;1) and ( 2;2).
4 We note that the total amount of energy in fex1 and fex2 is the same (see r1) so  can be dened
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Now, given that F consists of comparable valid ows, the order of two valid ows
f0;f 2 F is determined by the amount of energy they exchange, as follows:
(f) = (f0) =) f = f0
(f) > (f0) =) f > f0
(f) < (f0) =) f < f0
Following the above discussion, we notice that (i) the zero ow, f0 = (0;:::;0) 2 SV F is
a valid ow comparable to all valid ows, (ii) a valid ow f can be mapped to R0 via
(f) and (iii) a given interval of comparable valid ows IV F = [f0;f] can be mapped
to an equivalent interval IR = [0;:::x]  R0;x = (f).
We now discuss an alternative representation of a valid ow.
5.5.2 Alternative Representations of Valid Flows
We notice that for a given valid ow, the EEP requires its ows in an exchange period
to be the same. This implies that we can describe a valid ow in terms of energy it
exchanges. For example, let f = (f1;::::ft) and (f) = x. Then the amount of energy
transferred (or received) in each exchange period is x. Since each exchange period
consists of t
2 time periods, we have5:
f = (f1;::::ft); (f) = x =) f = (
2x
t
;:::
2x
t
; 
2x
t
;:::; 
2x
t
) (5.2)
Similarly, we can dene a valid ow in a more concise form as follows:
f = (f1;::::ft); (f) = x =) f = (x;t) (5.3)
Where (x;t) shows that f transfers x in ex1, receives x in ex2 in t time periods. Clearly,
these two arguments are sucient to reconstruct the valid ow. Such concise represen-
tations can be used during negotiation to avoid transmission of redundant information.
However, in the remainder of this thesis, all valid ows are described in their original rep-
resentation, i.e., f = (f1;::::ft), unless otherwise specied. This original representation
makes it easy to discuss how dierent variables (e.g., battery charging or discharging)
are dependent on link ow in specic time periods.
5Suppose f exchanges 5 kWh, then it transfers 5 kWh in ex1 and receives 5 kWh in ex2. If t = 10,
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5.5.3 Feasibility of a Valid Flow
A valid ow is feasible for an agent if the agent is capable of maintaining that ow on its
physical link. This capability of an agent is constrained by factors such as its generation,
battery charging or discharging rates and load requirements. We note that if an agent
has enough resources to maintain a higher valid ow, e.g., f = (2;2; 2; 2), then it
certainly has the capacity to maintain a lower ow, e.g., f0 = (1;1; 1; 1). However,
vice versa may not hold, i.e., maintaining a lower ow does not imply the feasibility of
higher ows as the agent may require more resources (e.g., more generation capacity or
higher discharging rate) to maintain that ow. We summarise this as follows.
If a valid ow f is feasible for an agent, then any valid ow f0 < f is also
feasible for that agent.
Lemma 1.
5.5.4 Arithmetic Operations on Valid Flows
We note that the basic arithmetic operations on valid ows result in valid ows. Since
we make extensive use of these operations, we present some examples here while detailed
proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Addition of subtraction of two valid results in a valid ow.
Lemma 2.
Example: Addition or subtraction of (2,2,-2,-2) and (1,1,-1,-1) is a valid ow.
Scalar multiplication or division of a valid ow results in a valid ow.
Lemma 3.
Example: If f = (1;1; 1; 1) is a valid ow then so is 2(1;1; 1; 1) = (2;2; 2; 2).
5.6 Optimal Valid Flow of an Agent
Having dened the basic properties of valid ows, we now discuss how an agent can
compute its valid ow. In Section 5.2, we showed that an agent can compute its utility64Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
for a given ow via Equation 5.1. Now, an optimal valid ow for an agent is a valid ow
that maximises Equation 5.1 and an agent can compute it as follows.
f = argmax
f2SV F
t X
i=1
(gi   ci + di   wi + fi) (5.4)
subjected to constraints r1 and r2 (in addition to fo2;:::;o8g).
Now, that an agent can compute its optimal valid ow as well as its utility for a given
valid ow, it can make and evaluate oers from other agents. We note that no par-
ticipating agent is guaranteed to obtain its optimal valid when negotiating exchange
under the EEP. Indeed, if an agent cannot obtain its optimal ow, it may consider ac-
cepting some other ow that gives it some increase in utility. In particular, consider
agent a with optimal ow f. Suppose that f is not acceptable to its opponent and
instead, a needs to either agree on a ow f0 or f00 where 0 < f0 < f00 < f. Since
f0 < f00 =) (f0) < (f00), the amount of energy that a can exchange via f00 is more
than f0. Intuitively speaking, a may prefer f00 over f0 because (i) with more exchange
it can further increase its utility and (ii) f00 is comparatively closer to f (thus more
similar to f in terms of utility). This is indeed the case as we prove in Lemma 4 (see
Appendix for the proof). Lemma 4 is stated as follows.
Let IV F = [f0;f]  SV F be an interval where f0 is the zero ow and f is
the optimal ow that gives agent a maximum utility. Then the utility, u, of
agent a is a monotonic function on IV F such that f0;f00 2 IV F j f0 < f0 <
f00 < f =) u(f0) < u(f0)  f00  u(f) holds.
Lemma 4.
This concludes our discussion on the properties of valid ows, SV F and optimal valid
ows. We now explain the EEP negotiation process in detail.
5.7 Negotiation Under the EEP
In this section, we explain how negotiation under the EEP proceeds in specied rounds.
We also discuss how participating agents can compute certain information such as their
exchange type and broadcast ow as the rounds proceed.Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange65
5.7.1 Round Zero
The EEP requires all agents to simultaneously broadcast their exchange types in round
zero. An agent can infer its exchange type (i.e., which exchange period it prefers to
receive energy in) by computing its optimal ow. The sole purpose of round zero is to
establish the role of makers and receivers. This makes it easier for a participating agent
to know which agents they should be making or receiving oers from in the subsequent
oer rounds. At the end of round zero, each agent knows the exchange type of all
participating agents. We note that an agent may not declare its true exchange type if
it believes that doing so may benet it. We discuss such strategies in Section 5.8.1.
5.7.2 Oer rounds
In oer rounds, makers make oers and receiver broadcast ows in order to reach an
agreed ow. This round proceeds in three stages as follows:
5.7.2.1 Step 1: Makers make oers
In the rst stage, each maker makes simultaneous oers to receivers which (i) are con-
nected to it and (ii) have indicated their participation earlier (in round zero or in the last
oer round). A maker needs to decide which oers to make and we refer to this decision
process as its strategy. Depending on its strategy, a maker can come up with any set of
valid oers that it believes will maximise its own utility. We discuss and formulate such
strategies in Section 5.8.2. At the end of this step, each receiver has a set of oers.
5.7.2.2 Step 2: Receivers broadcast valid ows
Having received oers, each receiver is required to broadcast a valid ow fBroadcast, and
as dictated by r3, fBroadcast cannot exceed the minimum oer that it has received. For
example, if receiver i receives F i oers than fBroadcast < min(F i). This restriction is
easily enforceable as the maker that made the minimum oer to the receiver, receives
fBroadcast (broadcasts are common knowledge). We note that each receiver is strate-
gic and it can broadcast any fBroadcast that it believes will maximise its utility (see
Section 5.8.3 on receivers' strategies), as long as fBroadcast obeys r3.
The outcome of this stage is the agreed ow lAgreed = min(F Broadcast) (r4), where
F Broadcast is the set of broadcast ow of all receivers. We note that lAgreed is the agreed
ow between every receiver and each of its respective makers. This ensures that the
amount of energy exchanged between any receiver and any of its respective makers is
the same in this oer round. This means that if maker i makes oers to x receivers then66Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
the agreed ow between i and each receiver in x is lAgreed. Consequently, the total agreed
ow for i in this oer round is the sum of all agreed ows between it and x receivers,
i.e., lAgreed x. Similarly, if receiver j oers from y makers, then its total agreed ow is
lAgreed  y. At the end of this round, each receiver and maker has agreed to exchange
energy according to lAgreed.
5.7.2.3 Step 3: Receivers indicate their participation in the next round
Having agreed to exchange as per lAgreed, an oer round ends with each receiver broad-
casting a boolean signal to indicate whether they wish to receive more oers in the next
oer round. This ensures that makers do not make oers to receivers which no longer
wish to exchange energy. This is the only stage which allows receivers to drop out of
negotiation. We note that the only rational strategy for a receiver, who is yet to ob-
tain its optimal ow, is to participate in further oer rounds in order to agree to more
exchange and increase its utility further. For makers who do not wish to participate
in further rounds, they can simply choose not to make oers in the next round. Oer
rounds terminate if there is either no maker or no receiver that wish to exchange energy.
Having outline our negotiation protocol, we now discuss now the EEP negotiation can
be modelled as a sequential game.
5.8 Negotiated Energy Exchange as a Sequential Game
Negotiation under the EEP can be modelled as a sequential game with unspecied
number of rounds (i.e., innite horizon) where agents make their moves in a well-dened
sequence. The EEP denes the moves of each participant as detailed in Section 5.7. In
order to explain the how this sequential game is played, we next discuss the moves of
each player and formulate their strategies.
5.8.1 Strategies in Round Zero
The EEP divides all participating agents into two exchange types (i.e., et1 and et2, see
Section 5.4) and dictates that each agent declare its exchange type in round zero. Agents
that prefer to receive energy in the same exchange period (e.g., ex1) are of the same
type. Let et = fet1;et2g be the set of exchange type, then we dene the strategy   of
a participating agent in round zero as:
  : et ! et (5.5)Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange67
Now, consider a particular strategy ^   2   which demands an agent to declare its true
exchange type. In Theorem 1, we show that the strategy prole where all agents play ^  
in round zero, is in Nash Equilibrium in round zero.
5.8.2 Strategy of Makers in an Oer Round
In an oer round, the strategy 
 of a maker describes how it chooses an oer for each
of its intended receivers. We dene it as

 : Rt ! Rtn (5.6)
Where n is the number of receivers. We note that makers are free to make any oers,
as long as they are valid ows.
Now, consider a strategy ^ 
 2 
 which makes an oer
f
n to each receiver, where f is
the optimal valid ow of the maker and n is the number of receivers. We refer to
f
n as
the divided optimal ow of the maker6 and denote it by d. For example, if a maker has
f = (2;2; 2; 2) and it is making oers to 2 receivers, then d = (1;1; 1; 1) and ^ 

is to oer each receiver d. In Theorem 2, we show that a particular strategy prole in
which all makers play ^ 
 in an oer round, is in Nash equilibrium.
5.8.3 Strategy of Receivers in an Oer Round
The EEP requires each receiver to broadcast a valid ow in an oer round. The strategy
 of a receiver describes its choice of valid ow to broadcast, given the oers it receives
and its optimal ow, as follows:
 : Rtn  Rt ! Rt (5.7)
Where n is the number of makers.
Now, consider a strategy ^  2  of a receiver. Let f be the optimal ow of the receiver,
F n be the set of oers it has received from n makers and min(F n) be the minimum
oer in F n. We refer to
f
n as the divided optimal ow (d) of the receiver. Then,
strategy ^  dictates that it broadcast the minimum of d and min(F n), i.e., fBroadcast =
min(d;min(F n)). For example, suppose a receiver has f = (4;4; 4; 4) and it receives
oers F n = f(1;1; 1; 1);(2;2; 2; 2)g from two makers, then d = (2;2; 2; 2).
Since min(F n) = (1;1; 1; 1) and min(F n) < d, strategy ^  is to broadcast fBroadcast =
d = (1;1; 1; 1). In Theorem 3, we show that a particular strategy prole in which
makers play ^  in an oer round, is in Nash equilibrium.
6We note that in an oer round, if the agreed ow equals to the divided optimal ow of an agent (i.e.,
l
Agreed =
f
n ), then the total agreed ow for that agent is l
Agreed  n = f
 (see Section 5.7.2.2). This
is the best possible outcome for it as it gets its optimal ow and thus the maximum possible utility.68Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
Having dened the strategies of participating agents in all rounds, we now present a
game theoretic analysis of the EEP.
5.9 A Game Theoretic Analysis of the EEP
In this section, we present a detailed game-theoretic analysis of the EEP. Our aim is to
demonstrate, via a series of theorems, that a particular strategy prole is in subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for the sequential game we outline in Section 5.8. We begin
by showing that round zero has a strategy prole in Nash equilibrium as follows.
In round zero, the strategy prole  = (^  1;::::; ^  n), for n participating agents
is in Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 1.
Proof. We know that et1 requires energy in ex1 while et2 requires energy in ex2 (see Section 5.4),
thus, energy exchange is possible only between opposite types (i.e., et1 and et2). In , when
all agents declare truthfully, all et1 agents become makers and et2 become receivers. Now, in
the subsequent oer rounds, energy exchange is possible only between any maker and receiver
as they are of the opposite types. Consider an agent i with et1 which declares its type to be et2
while all others declare their true types. In this case, i becomes a receiver and receives oers
from makers which have the same exchange type (i.e., et1), therefore, i can neither exchange
energy with any maker nor with any receiver (i can only receive oers). Similarly, when an agent
j with et2 declares its type to be et1 and becomes a maker, it can only make oers to receivers
which have the same exchange type (et2) as it has. Thus, by not declaring its true exchange
type in , a participating agent can only interact (make or receive oers) with agents of similar
types and cannot exchange energy (note that, by participating no agent can be worse o, see
Section 5.10.1). Therefore, no participating agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate in
strategy prole . Hence, proved.
In an oer round, strategy prole ' = (^ 
1;:::; ^ 
m; ^ m+1;:::; ^ m+r) leads to an
equilibrium outcome such that the agent with the minimum divided optimal
ow, obtains its optimal ow.
Theorem 2.
Proof. Let D = (d1;:::;dm;dm+1;:::;dm+r) be the divided optimal ow of m makers and r
receivers. Let F be the set of all oers and F
Broadcast be the set of 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broadcast. We know that r4 (see Section 5.4) dictates:
l
Agreed = min(F
Broadcast)
= min(f
Broadcast
m+1 ;:::;f
Broadcast
m+r )
Let F i  F be the oers that receiver i receives. We know that when i plays strategy ^ i, it
broadcasts f
Broadcast
i = min(di;min(F i)) where di 2 D is its divided optimal ow.
l
Agreed = min(f
Broadcast
m+1 ;:::;f
Broadcast
m+r )
= min
 
min(dm+1;min(F m+1));:::;min(dm+r;min(F m+r))

= min
 
dm+1;:::;dm+r;:::;min(F m+1);:::;min(F m+r)

= min
 
dm+1;:::;dm+r;min(F m+1;:::;F m+r)

= min
 
dm+1;:::;dm+r;min(F)

(5.8)
We know that a maker j playing ^ 
j, makes oers F j  F such that min(F j) = dj, where
dj 2 D is its divided optimal ow.
min(F) = min(min(F 1);::::;min(F m))
min(F) = min(d1;::::;dm)
l
Agreed = min(d1;:::;dm;dm+1;:::;dm+r) Subs. for min(F)
l
Agreed = min(D)
Clearly, in strategy prole ' the agreed ow is the minimum divided ow. Now, when an agent
i with di = min(D) obtains di, its total agreed ow is di  x = f (see Section 5.7.2.2) where
x is the number of agents that i makes or receives oers from and f is the optimal valid ow
of i. Hence, proved.
Let ' = (^ 
1;:::; ^ 
m; ^ m+1;:::; ^ m+r) be a strategy prole for an oer round,
such that m makers play ^ 
 and r receivers play ^ . Then no maker has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from ^ 
.
Theorem 3.
Proof. Let D = (d1;:::;dm;dm+1;:::;dm+r) be the set of divided optimal ows and F be the
set of all oers. When all receivers play ^ , then Equation 1.8 states:
l
Agreed = min
 
dm+1;:::;dm+r;min(F)

Let F j be the set of oers that maker j makes then:
min(F) = min
 
min(F 1);:::;min(F m)

We know that a maker j uses ^ 
j, it makes oers F j  F such that min(F j) = dj, where dj 2 D
is its divided optimal ow. Let maker i that makes oers to x receivers, deviate from ^ 
i, since70Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
all other makers play ^ 
:
min(F) = min
 
d1;:::;di 1;di+1;:::;dm;min(F i)

l
Agreed = min
 
d1;:::;di 1;di+1;:::;dm;dm+1;:::;dm+r;min(F i)

Subs. for min(F)
l
Agreed = min
 
min(D i);min(F i)

Where D i  D j D = D i [ di. Now, suppose that 9 
i 2 
i j ui(
i;' i) > ui(^ 
i;' i)
where 
i is the set of all strategies for i. We note that strategies in 
i can be summarised
according to their outcomes as we show in the following two cases. In each case, we prove by
contradiction that @ 
i 2 
i j ui(
i;' i) > ui(^ 
i;' i), as follows:
Case 1: min(D i)  di In this case, all strategies in 
i can be summarised as:

i = f
1
i; ^ 
i;
2
ig j 
1
i = min(F i) > di; ^ 
i = min(F i) = di; 
2
i = min(F i) < di
Table 5.1 shows the outcomes and utilities, corresponding to f
1
i; ^ 
i;
2
ig.
Strategy l
Agreed= Total Agreed Flow
Utility
min
 
min(D i);min(F i)

l
Agreed  x

1
i min(D i) ^ f = min(D i)  x
ui(
1
i;' i) = ui(^ f)
^ 
i min(D i) ui(^ 
i;' i) = ui(^ f)

2
i min
 
min(D i);min(F i)

f
2 = min
 
min(D i);min(F i)

 x ui(
2
i;' i) = ui(f
2)
Table 5.1: Utility of maker i for all strategies in 
i when min(D i)  di
Now, consider l
Agreed with respect to f
1
i; ^ 
i;
2
ig, we have:
min
 
min(D i);min(F i)

 min(D i)  di =) f
2  ^ f  f (f = di  x; see Section 5.7.2.2)
f
2  ^ f  f =) ui(f
2)  ui(^ f)  ui(f) (* Lemma 4)
Hence, in Case 1 @ 
i 2 
i j ui(
i;' i) > ui(^ 
i;' i).
Case 2: min(D i) > di In this case, it is suce to show that ^ 
i = min(F i) = di leads to
optimal ow and thus, maximum utility for i as follows:
Strategy l
Agreed= Total Agreed Flow Utility
min
 
min(D i);min(F i)

l
Agreed  x
^ 
i di f = di  x ui(^ 
i;' i) = ui(f)
No other strategy can improve upon the maximum utility ui(f), therefore @ 
i 2 
i j
ui(
i;' i) > ui(^ 
i;' i). Hence, proved for Case 2.
Thus, under no condition @ 
i 2 
i j ui(
i;' i) > ui(^ 
i;' i), therefore, maker i has no
incentive to unilaterally deviate from ^ 
i in strategy prole '. Hence, proved.Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange71
Let ' = (^ 
1;:::; ^ 
m; ^ m+1;:::; ^ m+r) be a strategy prole for an oer round,
such that m makers play ^ 
 and r receivers play ^ . Then, no receiver has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from ^ .
Theorem 4.
Proof. Consider receiver i with divided optimal ow di, received oers F i, and broadcast ow
li. We know that r4 (see Section 5.4) dictates:
l
Agreed = min(F
Broadcast)
= min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );li

Suppose 9 i 2 i j ui(i;' i) > ui(^ i;' i) where i is the set of all strategies for i. We note
that strategies in i can be summarised according to their respective outcomes, as we show in
the following three cases. In each case, we prove by contradiction that @ i 2 i j ui(i;' i) >
ui(^ i;' i), as follows:
Case 1: min(F i)  di  min(F
Broadcast
 i ): In this case, i can be summarised as7:
i = f^ i;0
ig j ^ i = li = min(di;min(F i)) = min(F i); 0
i = li < min(F i)
Table 5.2 shows the outcomes and utilities, corresponding to f^ i;0
ig.
Strategy l
Agreed= Total Agreed Flow
Utility
min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );li

l
Agreed  x
^ i min(F i) ^ f = min(F i)  x ui(^ i;' i) = ui(^ f)

0
i l
0
i f
0 = l
0
i  x ui(
0
i;' i) = ui(f
0)
Table 5.2: Utility of receiver i against i when min(F i)  di  min(F
Broadcast
 i ).
Now, consider l
Agreed with respect to f^ i;0
ig
l
0
i < min(F i)  di =) f
0 < ^ f  f (* f
0 = l
0
i  x; ^ f = min(F i)  x;f = di  x)
f
0 < ^ f  f =) ui(f
0)  ui(^ f)  ui(f) (* Lemma 4)
Hence, in Case 1 @ i 2 i j ui(i;' i) > ui(^ i;' i).
Case 2: min(F
Broadcast
 i )  di  min(F i): We summarise i as follows:
i = f1
i ;2
i ; ^ i;3
i g j 1
i = l
1
i = min(F i); 2
i = l
2
i j di < l
2
i < min(F i);
^ i = ^ l = min(di;min(F i)) = di; 3
i = l
3
i < di;
Now, Table 5.3 shows the outcomes and utilities, corresponding to f1
i ;2
i ; ^ i;3
i g.
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Strategy l
Agreed= Total Agreed Flow Utility
min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );li

l
Agreed  x
1
i
min(F
Broadcast
 i ) ^ f = min(F
Broadcast
 i )  x
ui(1
i ;' i) = ui(^ f)
2
i ui(2
i ;' i) = ui(^ f)
^ i ui(^ i;' i) = ui(^ f)
3
i min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );l
3
i

f
3 = min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );l
3
i

 x ui(3
i ;' i) = ui(f
3)
Table 5.3: Utility of receiver i against i when min(F
Broadcast
 i )  di  min(F i).
Now, consider l
Agreed with respect to f1
i ;2
i ; ^ i;3
i g
min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );l
3
i

 min(F
Broadcast
 i )  di =) f
3  ^ f  f
f
3  ^ f  f =) ui(f
3)  ui(^ f)  ui(f)
Hence, in Case 2 @ i 2 i j ui(i;' i) > ui(^ i;' i).
Case 3: di  min(F
Broadcast
 i )  min(F i): It is suce to show that ^ i leads to optimal valid
ow and thus, maximum utility for i as follows:
Strategy l
Agreed= Total Agreed Flow
Utility
min
 
min(F
Broadcast
 i );li

l
Agreed  x
^ i di f = di  x ui(^ i;' i) = ui(f)
No other strategy can improve upon ui(f) in Case 3, hence @ i 2 i j ui(i;' i) >
ui(^ i;' i). Thus, under no condition @ i 2 i j ui(i;' i) > ui(^ i;' i). Therefore, receiver
i has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from ^ i in strategy prole '. Hence, proved.
Let ' = (^ 
1;:::; ^ 
m; ^ m+1;:::; ^ m+r) be a strategy prole for an oer round, such
that m makers play ^ 
 and r receivers play ^ . Then ' is in Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.
Proof. This immediately follows from Theorem 2 and 3. In Theorem 2, we showed that no
maker has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from '. Similarly, in Theorem 3 we showed
that no receiver has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from '. Hence, in strategy prole ',
no participating agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from '. Hence, ' is in Nash
equilibrium in an oer round.Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange73
Let  be a strategy prole consisting of  and '. Then  is in subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for the EEP sequential game.
Theorem 6.
Proof. This immediately follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 4. In Theorem 1, we proved
that strategy prole  is in NE in round zero. In Theorem 4, we proved that ' is in NE in an
oer round. Now, any subgame of the EEP sequential game will consist of round zero and zero
or more oer rounds. Thus,  is the strategy prole such that for any given round in a subgame,
there is a corresponding strategy prole in  that is in NE for that round. Thus,  is in SPNE.
Hence, proved.
5.10 Properties of the Equilibrium Outcomes
Having shown the existence of a SPNE in the EEP negotiation, we now discuss some
properties of the SPNE outcomes.
5.10.1 Individual Rationality
For a participating agent, the equilibrium outcome under the EEP leads to (i) zero ow
- if there are no other agents (of opposite exchange type) then no ows are agreed and
the agent gets no change in its utility, (ii) optimal ow - agent gets its maximum utility
or (iii) a ow between zero and optimal ow in which case the agent gets some utility
(Lemma 4). Note that, a participating agent will never have to agree to a ow that
is greater than its optimal ow. Hence, a participating agent is never worse o in an
equilibrium outcome and, therefore, participation in the EEP is individually rational.
5.10.2 Termination
The guarantee that negotiation under the EEP terminates, emerges in a similar fashion
to monotonic concession protocols (see Section 2.4). As long as there are some agents
willing to make oers and some agents willing to accept oers in an oer round, exchange
agreement will take place in that round and the cumulative need for energy exchange
will reduce. This reduction, much like the utility reduction in proceeding rounds in
monotonic concession protocol, guarantees that negotiation will eventually terminate.74Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
5.10.3 Tractability
The EEP restrictions simplify negotiation such that it becomes tractable. More specif-
ically, r1 and r2 reduce S to SV F where it becomes easier for a maker to compute its
optimal valid ow via Equation (5.4) using an LP solver. Similarly, the LP formation of
Equation (5.1) allows receivers to evaluate oers in a tractable manner. All other com-
putations under the EEP such as nding the broadcast ow and choosing the agreed
ow are also tractable (see Section 5.8).
5.10.4 Concurrent, Many-to-Many Negotiation
The EEP allows many-to-many concurrent negotiation among agents in the sense that a
maker can simultaneously make oers to multiple receivers, while a receiver can simul-
taneously agrees to exchange with multiple makers. Consequently, in any oer round,
many agents make oer to many agents who respond to many agents.
5.10.5 Scalability
The scalability of the EEP negotiation originates from its tractability and concurrency.
For example, for a maker playing its best response, the number of receivers it is making
oers to, is simply a number by which it divides its optimal VF. Similarly, for a receiver,
the number of makers it has received oers is not relavant in the sense that it does not
need to evaluate each individual oer, or a combinatorial combination of oers. Instead,
its best response is to only broadcast the minimum of its divided optimal ow and
the minimum oer it received. These simple operations ensure that the EEP remains
scalable and applicable to a community of hundreds of homes.
5.10.6 Pareto-optimal Outcomes Under Strict Monotonicity
The equilibrium outcomes under the EEP are guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal in cases
where the monotonicity in utility function of agents (Lemma 4) is strict. While intuition
tells us that this may generally be the case (see Example 1 in Appendix A), the strict
monotonicity may not hold in some cases, in particular, when agents have plenty of
wasted energy (see Example 2 in Appendix A).
To show that strict monotonicity entails Pareto-optimal in the outcomes, consider a
with the optimal valid ow f, connected to a set of agents X. Under the EEP, its
negotiation with other agents ends in two scenarios. First, when in an oer round,
its total agreed ow is lAgreed = f. Now, any further change in the agreed ow will
decrease its utility and thus the outcome is Pareto-optimal. Second, the total agreedChapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange75
ow is less than its optimal ow but no other agent of opposite exchange type is willing
to negotiate in further rounds (they already have reached their optimal valid ows). In
this case, although agreeing to more ow will improve the utility of a, other agent(s)
will no longer gain their maximum utilities; hence, Pareto-optimality ensues. We note
that Pareto-optimality is guaranteed within SV F only because the EEP negotiation is
restricted to valid ows only. The Pareto-optimal solutions for negotiation where ows
are not required to be valid, could be dierent.
This concludes our discussion on the properties of the EEP outcomes. Before we present
an empirical evaluation of our protocol in Section 5.12, we discuss the Nash bargaining
solution as the theoretical upper bound against which we benchmark the EEP.
5.11 The Nash Bargaining Solution: Benchmark
In Section 2.3.1.1 we introduced the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), a widely known
axiomatic bargaining solution in the axiomatic bargaining, that agents can use to nd
a common satisfying solution (Nash, 1950a). Its axioms dene a unique solution that
maximises the product of gains in utility of agents. Note that, the NBS only denes
which solutions (in the set of all solutions) meet the dened axioms and not how agents
can reach such agreements. However, we can use it as the theoretical upper bound to
evaluate the EEP. In other words, it gives us the quantitative measure of how far the
EEP exchange agreements are from a fair solution2.
In the context of energy exchange, computing the NBS involves nding the ow f for
each agent so that the product of gains in their utility is maximised. Let (d1;:::;dm) 2
Rm be the utilities that m agents obtain when they are disconnected (also called dis-
agreement utilities). These disagreement utilities are the maximum utilities that agents
can get with no energy exchange. Let F = (f1,:::,fm) denote the ows for all agents.
Then, the NBS is the solution that maximises the following:
F NBS = argmax
(f1;:::;fm)
m Y
j=1
h
uj(fj)   dj
i
(5.9)
When S is compact and convex then the solution FNBS is unique Nash (1953) and
computing the optimal solution is straight forward using convex optimisation. However,
interdependency between issues gives rise to a non-convex solution set with multiple
NBS (Fujita et al. 2010) whereby stochastic optimisation techniques are needed. In
our case, we used simulated annealing (see Van Laarhoven and Aarts (1987) for a detail
discussion) to compute the NBS.
2Our choice of axiomatic solution was inuenced by three axioms (i) invariant to equivalent utility
representation, (ii) symmetry and (iii) Pareto-optimality. Both the Nash and Kalai-Smordinsky satisfy
these three axioms but we preferred the Nash's solution as it has received more attention in literature.76Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
Charging %
(kWh) Reduction
No Exchange 222.7 {
NBS 113.7 49%
EEP 141 37%
Table 5.4: Total Battery Charging - the EEP versus the NBS
5.12 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we present an empirical evaluation of the EEP to demonstrate its appli-
cability and potential benets. We rst show that energy exchange via the EEP can be
benecial to remote communities in a number of ways. We then discuss some empirical
examples to show the limitations of energy exchange under the EEP.
5.12.1 Experimental Setup
We begin by considering a community of 20 agents where each agent has a microgener-
ation unit (solar panel or wind turbine), some load and storage as follows.
Generation: Each agent has a microgeneration unit, either a 2.5kW wind turbine or a
3.5kW solar panel, with equal probability. The generation prole for each agent that has
a solar panel is drawn from N solar or from N wind for each agent with a wind turbine
(see Section 3.4.1.4).
Consumption and Storage The daily load requirements of an agent comes from the
low-income UK household in Section 3.4.2. We note that each agent in the community
has the same load requirements; since our focus is to show the diversity in generation is
sucient to demonstrate the usefulness of energy exchange.
Storage: We assume that agents have identical batteries with specication [s = 20kWh,
c = 4kWh, d =  4kWh, e = 90%] (see Section 3.4.3).
Given these proles, agents can compute their utilities without exchange (see Sec-
tion 3.1) using an LP solver while the NBS is calculated via simulated annealing (see
Section 5.11)3.
3Although our EEP can easily be scaled to 100s of agents, nding the NBS for benchmarking is much
harder for larger communities. For 20 agents via simulated annealing (205
24 possible solutions), it takes
over 8 hours on a 72TFlops (4 nodes each containing an 8-core with each core 2.27 Ghz) supercomputer.Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange77
5.12.2 Experimental Results
Given this setup, our main objectives are to show that by exchanging energy under EEP,
agents can (i) reduce their battery charging needs (ii) increase their utility even as the
battery eciency decreases. We simulate a community of 20 agents and calculate the
total battery charging with (i) no exchange and when they exchange energy via (ii) the
EEP and (iii) the NBS. We repeat this simulation 20 times and nd that, on average,
exchange via the NBS can save up to 48.9% of the total battery charging while the
EEP can save up to 36.7% (Table 5.4). This is important because electric batteries are
expensive (costing as much as 500 USD/kWh) and have a limited number of charging
cycles (3000 to 5000). Reducing the battery charging prolongs the battery life and
reduces the need for frequent replacements and thus savings in maintenance cost.
The above reduction in battery charging via exchange becomes more useful as the battery
eciency deteriorates with time and usage. To show this, we simulate a community of
20 agents and calculate its social welfare function (sum of all agents' utilities) as the
battery eciency of all agents is reduced (other parameters remain unchanged). With a
less ecient battery, the storage losses increases and therefore agents' utilities (without
exchange) decrease. However, by exchanging energy such losses can be avoided. Indeed,
Figure 5.3 shows that the exchange becomes increasingly useful as the battery eciency
reduces. In particular, we note that, on average, the NBS improves the social welfare
by 16.5% while the EEP does so by 13.7%.
As mentioned in Section 5.12, the goal of our experiments is to demonstrate the potential
benets of our EEP via empirical examples. Although Figure 5.3 and Table 5.4 achieve
our goal, we note that the quantitative improvements under the EEP are specic to the
simulation day (July 6, 2011) and should not be interpreted as general results. Indeed,
any quantitative improvements, as the result of energy exchange in a community, are
dependent on the nature and degree of diversity among agents. Similarly, the social
welfare comparison between the three cases (no exchange, EEP, NBS) in Figure 5.3, is
dependent on the diversity in generation times. To explore how this diversity impacts
the social welfare, we design an experiments in the next section.
5.12.3 Experimental Setup 2
We begin by considering a community of 20 agents where each agent has a microgener-
ation unit (solar panel or wind turbine), some load and storage as follows.
Generation: Each agent has a microgeneration unit, either a 2.5kW wind turbine or a
3.5kW solar panel, with equal probability.
Consumption and Storage: The daily load requirements of each agent and its battery
specication is the same as described in Section 5.12.1.78Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
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Figure 5.3: Social Welfare - the EEP versus the NBS
Simulation Days: We simulate energy exchange for the whole month of July, 2011.
Generation Proles: The generation prole of every agent that has a solar panel
is gsolar (see Section 3.4.2) and it is xed for all days. On a given day in July, the
generation prole of every agent that has a wind turbine is such that (i) the total energy
generated is 24 kWh and (ii) the generation pattern (how this 24kW is spread across
a day) follows the energy generation pattern (from wind power) on that day in our
Dataset 1 (see Section 3.4.2)8.
We note that this set up ensures that each day in July, 2011 is dierent only in terms
of how energy is generated from a wind turbine. All other parameters are unchanged.
This enables us to compare the changes in social welfare across the month as well as to
relate this change to variation in generation times.
Given this set up, we simulate energy exchange on each day in July and calculate the
social welfare of community when agents (i) do not exchange energy, (ii) exchange via the
EEP and (iii) exchange via the NBS, as shown in Figure 5.4. We make three observations
here. First, the gain in social welfare via exchange in general (i.e., the NBS and EEP)
varies each day, solely due to the wind pattern on that day. Second, the gap between
the NBS and EEP also varies on each day. Third, the social welfare on some days (e.g.,
July 3,4 and 12) does not increase via the EEP. This is because the generation from
wind power on those days is such that the agents with wind turbine cannot compute
a feasible valid ow. Thus, exchange under the EEP is not possible and no exchange
agreements are reached. On the contrary, exchange is possible via the NBS because
there are no restrictions on the ows and thus, agents have a great deal of exibility to
8Let g be generation prole and x =
P
gi 8gi 2 g for a particular in July, 2011. To scale g, we
multiply each gi by 24=x. The resultant generation prole retains the generation pattern while ensuring
the total amount generated is 24kWh. Note, we choose 24kWh for scaling because this is the total
amount of energy generated in g
wind. This ensures that the amount of energy generated from wind
power on each day of July is the same, however, the generation pattern of that day remains unaected.Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange79
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Figure 5.4: Social Welfare in July 2011- the EEP versus the NBS
reach agreements. However, the NBS is a theoretical upper bound here and it does not
specify the negotiation steps through which agents can reach such solutions.
To provide an insight into Figure 5.4, we show the energy generation proles and the
corresponding social welfare on some days (July 1, 6, 9, 12, 24 and 31), in Figure 5.5
and Figure 5.6, respectively. We note that the gain in social welfare via energy exchange
in general (i.e., the NBS and EEP) is comparatively more on the days where the two
generation proles (i.e., energy generated from the solar and wind polar) do not overlap
signicantly. For example, the overlap between the generation proles on July 1, 6, 9 and
31 (Figure 5.5(a)-(c) and (f)) is less compared to those on July 12 and 24 (Figure 5.5(d)
and (e)). Consequently, the gain in social welfare on July 1, 6, 9 and 31 is comparatively
more.
We also note that the EEP demand of energy exchange via valid ows may be too
restrictive in some cases. For example, on a given day, an agent may have (i) no feasible
valid ow (i.e., the agent can simply not maintain any valid ow on its link ow) or (ii)
some feasible valid ows but none of them can increase its utility. In both cases, this
agent cannot obtain more utility under the EEP. For example, the generation from wind
power on July 12, 24 and 31 (Figure 5.5(d)- 5.5(f)) is such that an agent that has a
wind turbine has no valid ow on these days which provides it with more utility . Thus,
no energy exchange via the EEP can take place on these days and consequently, social
welfare is not improved (Figure 5.6). However, energy exchange via the NBS allows any
ow and thus agents can still nd some (not valid) ows to exchange energy to improve
social welfare, as shown for July 12 and 31 in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6 also shows that energy exchange is not always useful. For example, the
generation proles on July 24 are similar (Figure 5.5(e)) to extent where neither the
NBS nor the EEP can provide agents with more utility.80Chapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange
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Figure 5.5: Energy generation proles on selected days in July, 2011.
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Figure 5.6: Social welfare on selected days in July, 2011.
5.13 Conclusion
The problem of negotiation over energy exchange is an interdependent multi-issue ne-
gotiation problem. We present a negotiation protocol, the EEP, which tackles this
complexity by imposing certain restrictions over oers, as so that agents have a strat-
egy prole in SPNE and negotiation is concurrent, scalable and entails Pareto-optimal
outcomes (under certain conditions). Using real-world data, we empirically evaluate
the EEP, benchmark it against the NBS and show that, in this instance, exchange via
the EEP reduces the total battery charging up to 37% (the NBS up to 49%) as well
as improves the overall utilities by 14% (the NBS up to 17%). When taken together,
these results show energy exchange via the EEP is useful in communities to improve theChapter 5 An Interdependent Multi-issue Negotiation Protocol for Energy Exchange81
ecient use of energy and storage. We also showed that any quantative improvements
via energy exchange in a community are dependent on the diversity among agents. In
addition, the benets that the EEP may vary depending on the diversity.
The EEP meets all the requirements that we set out for a solution to the negotiated
energy exchange problem in remote communities. More specically, the negotiation re-
quires no human input (REQ 1) and no payments (REQ 2). Participating in negotiation
is individually rational (REQ 3) in the sense that an agent is never required to accept
an exchange oer that will make it worse o. The EEP ensures that any agreed energy
exchange between two agents is fair (REQ 4) in that both transfer and receive the same
amount of energy. We note that it can be argued that two agents may value the same
amount of energy dierently and thus the actual utility they receive is unequal. This
argument has its foundation in the fact that any common medium (e.g., money) can
be valued dierently by two agents and hence the division gives them unequal utility.
This raises the fundamental question of whether equal division of good is just. We note
that this issue is contentious among researchers (and philosophers) with either side yet
to convince the other (we recommend Binmore (2009) for further discussion). One line
of argument from evolutionary psychology suggests that humans have evolved to favour
agreements which propose equal division of goods among participants (Alexander, 2000;
Binmore, 2009). We lean towards this side as this criterion has been extensively used in
research across many domains (Binmore, 2009) and, additionally, equal division is easy
to dene and verify in practice. Moreover, the EEP also guarantees that the agreed
energy exchange is Pareto-optimal (within the restricted set of valid oers - see Sec-
tion 5.10). We also discuss how the EEP guarantees that negotiation will terminate
(REQ 6) and is scalable to hundreds of agents (REQ 7). In addition, the EEP meets
our stability requirement in the sense that agents have a strategy prole in the subgame
Nash perfect equilibrium where they reveal their true exchange preference (i.e., exchange
type and the link ow that maximises their own utility). In this way, no single agent
can increase its utility by unilaterally deviating from a strategy (REQ 8). Finally, each
agent negotiates directly with others in a decentralised manner (REQ 9) as there is no
intermediary or mediator required by the EEP.
Having presented our solution to the negotiated energy exchange problem, in the next
chapter we conclude and present our future work.Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we present an overview of the contributions of this thesis towards the
goal of enabling energy exchange in remote communities. In particular, we discuss the
practicality of our developed solutions in remote communities and the implications of
our empirical results.
6.1 Summary of Results
As we mentioned in Chapter 1, enabling access to electricity in remote communities
is a big challenge for countries around the world. Some recent initiatives provide the
unit-per-household microgeneration infrastructure to homes in remote communities. At
present, these resources are operated in isolation, fullling individual home needs, which
results in an inecient and costly use of resources. In this thesis, we argued that these
resources can be used more eciently by connecting homes in a remote community in
order to exchange energy.
Connecting homes in a remote community is technologically feasible and we discussed
how microgrid technologies can be used to establish small-scale power supply networks
in remote communities that can transmit power as well as data (Chapter 2). Microgrids
support a number of network topologies and we presented examples of a bus and a
peer-to-peer topology (Chapter 4 and 5) in which homes can be connected.
Enabling energy exchange in a community of connected homes comes with certain re-
quirements. These requirements originate from the lack of infrastructure in remote
communities and when self-interested households interact with each other to exchange
energy. Based on these requirements, we proposed two ways to enable energy exchange
in remote communities:(i) cooperative energy exchange and (ii) negotiated energy ex-
change. We then developed solutions to address each problem as follows.
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In Chapter 4, we presented a cooperative energy exchange solution where homes in
remote communities can form a coalition to exchange energy. This energy exchange
entails the overall battery usage as well as energy savings for the community. Using real
world data, we empirically evaluate our solution to show that energy exchange (i) can
reduce the need for battery charging (by close to 65%) in a community compared with
when they do not exchange energy and (ii) can improve the ecient use of energy (by
up to 10% in general cases) compared with no energy exchange.
In Chapter 5, we presented an energy exchange protocol (EEP) to enable agents to
negotiate directly with each other and reach energy exchange agreements. Using real
world data, we empirically evaluated the EEP and showed that, in this instance, a
society of agents can (i) improve the overall utilities by 14% and (ii) reduce their overall
use of the batteries by 37%, compared to when they do not exchange energy.
Having summarised our empirical results, in the next section we discuss their implica-
tions in the context of remote communities.
6.2 Implications of Our Empirical Results
Our empirical evaluations are intended to provide not only a quantitative measure on
the usefulness of our developed solutions for a typical remote community, but they also
validate the idea of energy exchange in remote communities in general. In the following,
we discuss the implications of our empirical results in the light of challenges and possible
future trends in remote communities.
The rst important benet of energy exchange is the reduction in battery usage. Electric
batteries are expensive, costing as high as 500 USD/kWh. Additionally, they have a
limited number of charging cycles (e.g., from 3,000 to 5,000). This limited number
of charging cycles means that the electric batteries are required to be replaced more
often, compared to other components in an o-grid system. A direct eect of reduction
in their usage is the longer battery life and thus reduced maintenance cost for an o-
grid system. We showed that by exchanging energy, a remote community can reduce
its overall battery usage. In particular, Section 4.3 shows that the overall reduction
in battery usage can be up to 64% in case of cooperative energy exchange or 37% in
case of negotiated energy exchange. This reduction shows that energy exchange has the
potential to reduce maintenance cost in remost communities.
We also mentioned (in Chapter 2) that there is a growing interest in providing the o-grid
communities with used electric batteries (Cready et al., 2003; Chaitanya et al., 2011),
in particular, used EV batteries (Hein et al., 2012; Onar et al., 2012). Examples of such
projects include the US Government sponsored, Second-Use Project and Nissans 4R84 Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Work
Energy Project for their LEAF EV battery re-use1. Such projects hint at the possibility
that, in the near future, remote communities may have the used EV batteries and
thus access to larger storage capacity. We consider this possibility in Chapter 4 and
showed that energy exchange becomes more useful in the presence of used batteries.
This increased benet comes from the fact that used batteries are typically less ecient
(thus energy storage losses are more pronounced) and via energy exchange more energy
can be saved. Therefore, in the likely scenario of used batteries in remote communities,
energy exchange can help reduce the energy storage losses.
Our work can also be useful in unit sizing, a process where engineers estimate the optimal
size of a microgeneration unit and storage for a home (Geem, 2012; Kellogg et al., 1998).
Here, connecting the home to a neighbour's or community will enable energy exchange
which can help reduce the need for storage and improve the ecient use of electricity.
This reduction, where applicable, can be taken into account while estimating the optimal
requirements of a home and thus the capital cost of a microgeneration unit or storage
can be reduced.
Furthermore, electric batteries become less ecient with regular use and, as a conse-
quence, the energy storage losses increase. We demonstrated this eect in Chapter 5 and
showed that with the gradual reduction in battery eciency of all households (otherwise
stated, with the gradual increase of storage losses), energy exchange gradually becomes
more useful.
Our work can also be benecial for organisations (such as NGOs and governmental agen-
cies) that are interested in providing microgeneration units to the remote communities
in the developing world. In Chapter 4, we showed that agent-based simulations can be
useful in nding the right mixture and combination of microgeneration units and storage
to bring down the infrastructure cost.
This concludes the discussion and implications of our empirical results. In the next
section, we discuss the potential future work.
6.3 Future Work
We have argued in Chapter 1, and then empirically demonstrated in Chapter 3 and 4,
that energy exchange has many potential benets in remote communities. Our devel-
oped solutions in Chapter 3 and 4 are, to the best of our knowledge, the rst attempt to
address the problem of energy exchange in remote communities. While we have demon-
strated the applicability of our solutions, they can be improved in a number of ways.
For example, energy generation from some renewable generation units (e.g., solar panels
1See details on Second-Use project at www.nrel.gov/vehiclesandfuels/energystorage and Nissan's
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and wind turbines) is weather-dependent and, thus, marked with uncertainty. Likewise,
energy consumption is associated with uncertainty that originates from predicting hu-
man behaviour. Our developed solutions can be extended to model this uncertainty in
generation and consumption and study the impact of energy exchange with regard to
this uncertainty. For instance, agents in a community may exchange energy to reduce
the uncertainty in their generation and thus ensure reliable power supply.
In addition, the restrictions of our energy exchange protocol could be perceived as too
restrictive in some cases and one future line of work is to investigate the eects of relaxing
these restrictions on the negotiation. This may lead to weaker notion of equilibria or
hamper the scalability of the negotiation, but it can also enable agents to reach better
agreements from a larger set of possible solutions.Appendix A
Lemmas and Examples
Addition of subtraction of valid ows result in valid ows.
Lemma 1.
Let f0 = (f0
1;f0
2;f0
3;f0
4) 2 SV F , f00 = (f00
1 ;f00
2 ;f00
3 ;f00
4 ) 2 SV F and f = f0 + f00,
i.e., f = (f0
1 + f00
1 ;f0
2 + f00
2 ;f0
3 + f00
3 ;f0
4 + f00
4 )
Check for r1
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2 =  (f0
3 + f0
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f00
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Check for r2
jf0
1j = jf0
2j = jf0
3j = jf0
4j * f0 2 SV F
jf00
1 j = jf00
2 j = jf00
3 j = jf00
4 j * f00 2 SV F
=) jf0
1j + jf00
1 j = jf0
2j + jf00
2 j = jf0
3j + jf00
3 j = jf0
4 + f00
4 j
Therefore, f satises r2. Since f satises r1 and r2, it is valid ow.
Example: Addition or subtraction of (2,2,-2,-2) and (1,1,-1,-1) is a valid ow.
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Scalar multiplication or division of a valid ow results in a valid ow.
Lemma 2.
Let f = (f1;f2;f3;f4) 2 SV F, c 2 R and let f0 = c  f, i.e., f0 = (cf1;cf2;cf3;cf4).
Check for r1
f1 + f2 =  (f3 + f0
4)
=) cf1 + cf2 =  (cf3 + cf4)
Therefore, f0 satises r1.
Check for r2
jf1j = jf2j = jf3j = jf4j
=) cjf1j = cjf2j = cjf3j = cjf4j
Therefore, f0 satises r2.
Since f0 satises r1 and r2, it is valid ow.
Example: If f = (1;1; 1; 1) is valid ow then any scalar multiple of f such as
(2;2; 2; 2) or ( 1; 1;1;1) is also a valid ow.88 Appendix A Lemmas and Examples
Let IV F = [f0; ^ f]  SV F be an interval where f0 is the zero ow and ^ f is the
optimal ow that gives agent a maximum utility. Then utility is a monotonic
function on IV F i.e., f0;f00 2 IV F j f0 < f0 < f00 < ^ f =) u(f0)  u(f0) 
f00  u( ^ f) holds.
Lemma 3.
We rst show that our LP model for valid ows (Section 5.6) can be simplied
to one where t ow constraints can be replaced by a single inequality constraint.
This enables us to show that change in t ows equates to change in a single
real-valued constraint. We then use a general property of linear programming to
conclude the monotonicity in utility function over IV F.
STEP 1: Equivalent Representation of Valid Flows
We know that the amount of ow in each time period of a valid ow is the same.
Hence, a valid ow f = (f1;:::;ft) can be described as f = (z;:::;z; z:::; z)
where z 2 R. Similarly, IV F = [f0; ^ f] can be mapped (see Section 5.5.1 for more
discussion) to IR = [0; ^ z] where ^ f = (^ z;:::; ^ z; ^ z:::; ^ z) .
STEP 2: Equivalent Representation of the Utility Function
For a given valid ow f, an agent can compute its utility as follows (see Section 5.2)
u(f) = max
t X
i=1
(gi   ci + di   wi + fi) 8i 2 t (5:2)
We can reformulate it as per the alternative representation of f, as follows
u(z) = max
t X
i=1
(gi   ci + di   wi + z) 8i 2 t (A.1)
We note that Equation (5:2) and Equation (A.1) are equivalent LPs such that
(i) u(f) = u(z), (ii) evaluating Equation (5:2) over interval IV F equates to
evaluating Equation (A.1) over IR and (iii) if ^ f 2 IV F maximises Equation (5:2),
then ^ z 2 IR maximises Equation (A.1).
STEP 3: Monotonicity in Equation (A.1) over IR
To show that the utility function is monotonic over IR, let us evaluate Equa-
tion (A.1) subjected to
z  ^ z (o19)
We are given that Equation (A.1) attains maxima at ^ z. Hence, o19 is satised
at the maximal value (or at the boundary) which is referred to as an inequality
constraint being strictly satised.Appendix A Lemmas and Examples 89
Now, as we tighten (i.e., reduce the value of) o19, the sensitivity analysis of linear
optimisation guarantees that the per unit change in the objective value (i.e.,
utility) is monotonic,21. This per unit change in the objective value is referred
to as the shadow price (also known as Lagrangian multiplier or dual variables)
of the constraint. More specically, when an objective function is maximised
for a  inequality constraint, its objective value is guaranteed to monotonically
decrease as the constraint is reduced. Similarly, when we reduce the value of z
further, the objective value of Equation A.1 monotonically decreases. This also
means that given z0;z00 2 IR j z0 < z00 < ^ z =) u(z0)  u(z00)  u(^ z).
STEP 4: Monotonicity in Equation (5:2) over IV F
We already know that evaluating Equation (5:2) over IV F equates to evaluating
Equation (A.1) over IR. More specically, u(f) = u(z). Let f0;f00 2 IV F j f0 <
f00 and their corresponding z0;z00 2 IR, we know that u(z0)  u(z00) =) u(f0) 
u(f00). Hence, monotonicity holds3.
1See (Bisschop, 2006, p.42) for a discussion on the shadow prices and and its monotonic relation to
objective value. (Carter, 2001, p 542) an in-depth on this topic.
2See (Carter, 2001, p.542) for the Lagrangian theorem on  values. A simpler but shorter proof can
be found at (Fourer, 2004, p.56).
3We note that for a given set of data, the shadow price can be computed to show if the monotonicity
is strict over a given interval. In special cases, it can be inferred without the need of solving an LP
model. For example when it can be shown that the corresponding dual value of a constraint is strictly
positive or the optimal basis for a given LP model does not change. In general, such LP models are much
simpler and normally it is dicult to know which constraints will be binding in the optimal solution
(provided if the optimal solution exists).90 Appendix A Lemmas and Examples
Figure A.1: As exchange ow is reduced, more energy storage losses incur and hence
the utility drops.
The monotonicity in Lemma 3 is strict in some cases.
Example A.1.
Before we discuss this example, we note that (i) the utility of an agent is the
total energy that it uses, (ii) energy exchange via the EEP does not bring in more
energy because the amount of energy transferred or received is the same, hence
(iii) the utility increases via exchange only when either exchange reduces storage
losses and/or wasted energy.
Now, consider agent a with [Generation=3kWh, Load=1kWh] in ex1, and [Gen-
eration=1kWh, Load=3kWh] in ex2 as shown in Figure A.1(a). We dene utility
as the load satised and since it can satisfy 1kWh in ex1 and 1kWh in ex2 its
utility is 2. Now, let us provide a with a 50% ecient battery1. Now, the optimal
solution is to charge the battery in ex1 and discharge it in ex2 where load can be
satised(see Figure A.1(b)). We notice that despite storing 2kWh in ex1 we can
only retreive 1kWh in ex2 due to storage losses. The utility is now 3.
Now imagine that a can also exchange energy (via the EEP). Figure A.1(c) shows
the optimal solution whereby a sends energy in ex1 and receives it back in ex2.
The utility now increases to 4. We make three notes here. First, the exchange
(2; 2) is the optimal valid ow of a. Second, by exchanging energy it can avoid
the energy storage losses. Third, exchange under the EEP can be perceived as
charging and discharging a 100% ecient battery.
aThis makes it easier to visualise the dierence in charging and discharging. The
example will work as long as battery is not 100% ecient.Appendix A Lemmas and Examples 91
Figure A.2: As the optimal ow is constrained, the utility drops in a strictly mono-
tonic fashion.
When this 'battery' is present, the optiaml solution does not use a lesser ecient
battery. Finally, let us constraint the ow by allowing that the agent can only
exchange up to 1kWh. Figure A.1(d) shows the optimal solution which is to
exchange as much as possible (1kWh) and uses the battery for the rest. The utility
now drops to 3.5 from 4. This demonstrate the idea that as the ow reduces, the
energy storage loss increases and hence less utility for the agent.
Now, the instantaneous change in utility as the ow is constrained, is the shadow
price of this constraint. Figure A.2 shows the utility of an agent against the ow.
The shadow price here is the slope m of the line from (3;0) to (4;2), and given
the two points we calculate m = 2. Note that this shadow price is positive here,
implying that utility is monotonically increasing in the direction of the ow. Now,
when the ow is considered over t time periods, the shadow price is the sum of
the rates at which the utility drops in each time periods.
To show that such strict monotonicity holds in cases where energy exchange re-
duces energy waste, consider an example where a with [Generation = 3kWh,
Load=0kWh] in ex1 and [Generation = 0kWh, Load=3kWh] in ex2. Let us sup-
pose that a has a battery that can only store 2kWh charge. Now, when a does
not exchange, it can only store 2kWh and thus 1kWh generation cannot be used
or wasted. Now, suppose a can exchange up to 1kWh. Then the optimal solution
is to store 2kWh in the battery and transfer 1kWh in ex1, and then use and then
use the stored energy as well as received 1kWh in ex2. Now, clearly if the ow
is reduced from (-1,1) to say (0.5,-0.5), then it is obvious that the 0.5kWh that
is not exchange is lost. Hence, compared to the above example, the utility loss is
much more pronounced if a utilises its wasted energy via exchange.92 Appendix A Lemmas and Examples
The monotonicity in Lemma 3 is not strict in some cases.
Example A.2.
We note that we can construct counter examples to show that this monotonicity
does not hold in extreme cases such as when agents have more wasted energy than
their actual demand, as follows.
Consider a with [Generation = 5kWh, Load=0kWh] in ex1 and [Generation =
0kWh, Load=1kWh] in ex2. Suppose that a has no battery (or that the battery
maximum capacity is already reached). Now, let suppose that a has a ow (-
1,1) where it transfers 1kWh in ex1 and receives it back in ex2. However, we
note that the ow (-2,2) gives a the same utility. This is because a meets the
same demand (1kWh in ex2) with (-2,2) that it does with (-1,1). Although a is
indierent between these two ows, its opponent(s) may prefer (-2,2) over (-1,1).
Thus, agreed ow reached in this scenarios may not be Pareto-Optimal.Appendix B
Smart Home Framework
We present our Smart Home Framework (SHF) which simplies the modelling, proto-
typing and simulation of smart infrastructure (i.e., smart home and smart communities).
It provides the buildings blocks (e.g., home appliances) that can be extended and assem-
bled together to build a smart infrastructure model to which appropriate AI techniques
can be applied. This approach enables rapid modelling where new research initiatives
can build on existing work.
B.1 Introduction
Smart infrastructure such as smart homes, smart buildings and smart communities are
considered to be an integral part of the transition to a low-carbon economy. This
infrastructures is intended to embody many technologies such as smart meters, energy-
ecient appliances, renewable-energy generation units, microstorage and electric vehi-
cles. Hence, a number of research initiatives have focused on the role and interplay of
these technologies in smart infrastructure. The majority of work in this line involves
similar activities such as building a model of smart building, incorporating intelligence
and simulation (Augusto and Nugent, 2006, p. 132), which have resulted in a number of
shared and reusable tools, particularly, a large number of simulation software, with no-
table examples of GridLab-D, Open-DSS, Simulink-SmartGrid and MapleSim. However,
other activities have not received their due attention, especially in the modelling phase
where there is an absence of shared tools and resources that can help create models of
smart infrastructure. We believe that the development of such modelling resources will
enable new research initiatives to build upon existing work, rather than starting from
scratch. As a step towards this vision, we present a smart home framework (SHF): a
software framework that provides the building blocks (e.g. appliances, generators and
storage) that can be assembled together to build general models of smart homes and
communities. These components can be extended to construct specialised models to
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meet the specic needs of any particular project. This approach enables rapid, bottom-
up modelling of smart homes and communities where these components and models can
be shared and reused. We envision that such reuse will eventually lead to standardised
models (e.g., a standard model of a washing machine or a smart home) to be shared (e.g.,
via online repositories) and reused across the community. In addition, the SHF comes
with a software toolkit that helps in optimisation and visualisation of data. Finally, the
SHF is aimed at enabling collaboration between researchers and is available as a free,
open-source framework to all.
B.2 Related Work
The core purpose of our SHF is to enable researchers to quickly build the models of smart
homes and communities by assembling general components. An example is to build a
smart home by putting together components such as a solar panel, some appliances, an
electric battery and an electric vehicle or any other customised component. We note that
the majority of simulation software come with parameterised models of common compo-
nents which can be customised using the parameters values. For example, GridLab-D
and MapleSim allow users to specify parameters for an appliance (e.g., energy-baseline
(kWh) or motor-power (kW) for a washing machine). However, such models are tightly
integrated into the simulator and there is little exibility of extending them into new
models. For example, it can be dicult to extend an existing washing machine model
into one that has a built-in dryer. In contrast, the SHF provides models that can be
easily extended into specialised models. This focus on modelling, rather than simula-
tion, is the core dierence between the SHF and simulation software and therefore, the
SHF should be considered as a modelling tool and not as a replacement of the simulation
software. Indeed, there may be cases where both can be used together. An example is
where the SHF-based smart home models can be integrated with a simulator for very
large-scale simulation.
B.3 Smart Home Framework
Our SHF architecture is based on a bottom-up, extendible and plug-in methodology.
The basic components are dened in a exible hierarchy (e.g., SolarPanel implements
IRenewableGenerator extends IOnSiteGenrator extends IGenerator, see Smart Home
Framework (2013) for UML diagrams) making it easier to include new code. The plug-
in approach is useful to replace the existing code, for example, a new optimiser can be
plugged-in to replace the default optimiser in the toolkit.Appendix B Smart Home Framework 95
B.3.1 Building a Smart Home Model
The SHF provides a rich set of interfaces, abstract and implemented classes as we sum-
marise now. Detailed UML diagrams, tutorials and example code are available online
Smart Home Framework (2013).
Generation: The SHF provides classes to model (i) onsite generation and (ii) the elec-
tricity grid. Onsite generation include renewable and non-renewable (e.g., combined
heat-power) generation. An energy source has certain attributes and operations de-
pending on its type. For instance, the onsite non-renewable have an operational cost
(monetary and/or carbon footprint) while the renewable have uncertain power outputs.
The generation module contains implemented classes for a number of energy sources that
can be readily instantiated. A new type of generator can be added by extending the
appropriate interface (e.g., IRenewableEnergySource or INonRenewableEnergySource).
Furthermore, this module has tari classes (e.g., standard and o-peak) that can con-
nect a smart home to the grid. Additional classes exist to include more sophisticated
types of taris.
Storage: The SHF contains classes to model (i) onsite storage (e.g., electric batteries
at homes) and (ii) mobile storage. Each storage class has dierent attributes (e.g., on-
site storage is assumed to be available all the time). The SHF provides basic models of
electric batteries in terms of their capacity, charging and discharging rates and eciency
while more sophisticated models can be created by extension.
Load: Load requirements are described in terms of appliances and their usage (i.e.,
load events). Common appliances (e.g., oven, fridge) are already implemented and more
sophisticated models can be added. A load event describes a single use of an appliance
and has a certain type and attributes. The supported load event types are: (i) deferrable
and non-deferrable (ii) interruptible and non interruptible (iii) critical (iv) baseload (v)
or combinations (e.g. a deferrable, interruptible and load event). It also supports simple
loads to model loads in an appliance-independent way.
Miscellaneous: The SHF also supports HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning)
systems and electric vehicles.
B.3.2 Building a Smart Community
The SHF can be used to create multiple smart homes that collectively can represent
a smart community. This community can be o-grid or connected to the grid. When
a community model is ready it can be optimised or simulated (either using the SHF
optimisation package or a third-party simulator) as a whole Alam et al. (2013a) or on
an individual homes basis Alam et al. (2013b).96 Appendix B Smart Home Framework
Figure B.1: Graphs (battery, EV, loads, preferences, generation, HVAC) show optimal
use of resources in a home.
B.3.3 Additional Toolkits
The SHF comes with a toolkit that contains (i) an optimisation and (ii) a visualisation
package. The optimisation package includes a default optimiser (i.e., IBM CPLEX,
available free of cost to academia) that supports convex optimisation and for more
sophisticated or non-convex optimisation, a third-party optimiser can be plugged-in to
replace it. The visualisation package is essentially a customised wrapper around the
JFreeChart library that can be used to visualise data. For example, it can be used
to quickly plot the load events or the battery charging in a smart home. Figure 1
shows an example where a smart home model is built and optimised using the default
appliances/devices and CPLEX optimiser and results are plotted via the visual toolkit.
No additional code was needed outside the framework.
B.4 Applied Examples and Resources
We have utilised the SHF to enables smart homes to exchange energy. For example, using
the SHF we created an o-grid community where each home has a microgeneration unit,
an electric battery and some load. We then showed that the cooperative exchange of
energy in such communities can reduce the overall battery usage by 65% Alam et al.
(2013a). More recently, we presented a negotiation protocol to facilitate decentralised
energy exchange between self-interested agents to reduce their battery usage Alam et al.Appendix B Smart Home Framework 97
(2013b). In addition to this work, we believe that the SHF can be especially useful
for research projects focused on exploring demand response, uncertainty in renewable
generation, optimal energy usage for cost and carbon emissions reduction, electric vehicle
charging, coalition formation for group taris and intelligent heating.
The SHF website Smart Home Framework (2013) has the tutorials and example code
to help get started with the SHF. We also provide examples to build a model of (i) a
smart home and (ii) a smart community using the SHF and its toolkit. The SHF code
is hosted on GitHub and is freely available under GP Licence.
B.5 Future Work
At present, the SHF provides minimal support to model utilities other than electric-
ity (e.g., gas and water). Our future work will provide modelling capacity for these
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